


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
GEORGE MEADE.



*George Washington Flowers
Memorial Collection*

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14.21 APPENDIX

REPORT

OF

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HOLMES

OF THE

BATTLE OF HELENA;

ALSO,

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL A. P. HILL

OF THE

BATTLE OF BRISTOE STATION;

ALSO,

REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL STEVENSON


OF

EXPEDITION INTO EAST TENNESSEE.

PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF CONGRESS.

RICHMOND:

R. M. SMITH, PUBLIC PRINTER,
1864.



MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT.

RICHMOND, VA., January 19, 1864.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I herewith transmit, for your information, a communication from the Secretary of War, covering copies of several additional reports of military operations during the last year.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, WAR DEPARTMENT, }
Richmond, Va., January 18, 1864. }*To the President of the Confederate States:*

SIR: I have the honor to forward, for the information of Congress, copies of the reports of Lieutenant General Holmes and his subordinates of the battle of Helena; and of Lieutenant General A. P. Hill and his subordinates of the battle of Bristoe Station; also, of Major General Stevenson and subordinates of expedition into East Tennessee.

I am, sir, respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

JAMES A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War.

BATTLE OF HELENA.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HOLMES.

LITTLE ROCK, August 14th, 1863.

Brigadier General W. R. BOGGS,
*Chief of Staff, Department Trans-Mississippi,
Shreveport, Louisiana:*

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit to the Lieutenant General commanding the following report of the attack made by me upon Helena, on the 4th of July, 1863:

In the month of June, 1862, the Federal forces, under General Curtis, from the attempted invasion of Arkansas betook themselves to the city of Helena, and there fortified. Since that time it has been constantly and heavily garrisoned by Federal troops. The possession of this place has been of immense advantage to the enemy. From it, they have threatened at all times an invasion of Arkansas, thereby rendering it necessary that troops should be held in position to repel such invasion. From it, they have controlled the trade and sentiments of a large and important scope of country. It has been to them a most important depot for troops in their operations against Vicksburg.

In view of these great advantages to them, of the great embarrassment to my movements elsewhere, arising from the proximity of a large and threatening army, and of the deleterious effect on that portion of the State caused by their presence, it was deemed of very great importance that they should be driven from their only stronghold in Arkansas. As a means of raising the siege of Vicksburg, and of keeping the Mississippi river closed, in the event of the surrender of that city, the policy of the move was perfectly apparent. Moreover, from information, considered reliable, in my possession, the capture of Helena by the forces at my disposal seemed perfectly practicable.

On the 14th June, 1863, I telegraphed to Lieut. General Smith, that I believed I could take the place, and asked his permission to attack it. Two days after I started to Jacksonport, there to consult with Generals Price and Marmaduke, and to make the necessary preliminary arrangements. The result of this interview was the following orders :

Price's command, consisting General McRae's Arkansas and General Parson's Missouri brigades of infantry, constituting Price's division, and Colonel Green's and Shelby's brigades of Missouri cavalry, Marmaduke's division, to rendezvous at Cotton Plant, and Brigadier General Fagan's Arkansas brigade of infantry, at Clarendon, on the 26th June, (Friday,) whence by converging roads, the two columns would move in the direction of Helena. I also informed General Walker, commanding brigade of cavalry, in the vicinity of Helena, of my intention, and directed him to allow no ingress to the place.

Upon my return to Little Rock, I found that General Smith had fully sanctioned my proposed attack, and that the Secretary of War had written a strong letter, suggesting, advising and urging it. Thus encouraged, on the 26th of June, I proceeded to Clarendon, and assumed command of the expedition. From unavoidable necessity, consequent upon rain, high water and wretched roads, General Price's command did not reach its rendezvous for four days after the date fixed, thus giving the enemy abundant notice of my approach. General Fagan arrived at his place of rendezvous (Clarendon,) on the 26th. As soon as the troops were in position, I proceeded towards Helena by converging roads, and reached Allan Polk's house, five miles from Helena, on the morning of July 3d.

Having received full, accurate and reliable information of the forces and fortifications of the enemy in Helena, and the topography of the surrounding country, I here made the final disposition for the attack. That information disclosed that the place was very much more difficult of access, and the fortifications very much stronger than I had supposed, before undertaking the expedition ; the features of the country being peculiarly adapted to defence, and all that the art of engineering could do, having been brought to bear to strengthen it. The fortifications consisted of one regular work, heavily armed with siege guns, and four strong redoubts, mounted with field pieces, and protected by rifle-pits on suburban hills. (See the map.)

The disposition for the attack was as per following order :

"The attack on Helena will be made to-morrow morning at daylight, and as follows :

"First—Major General Price, in command of McRae's and Parsons' brigades, will proceed by the best route, assume position, assault and take Grave-yard hill, at daylight.

"Second—Brigadier General Walker, with his cavalry brigade, will, in like manner, proceed to the Sterling road, where he will hold himself in position, to resist any troops that may approach Righton hill ; and when that position is captured, he will enter the town and act against the enemy as circumstances may justify.

"Third—Brigadier General Fagan will proceed by the best route, assume position, and take the batteries on Hindman hill, at daylight.

"Fourth—Brigadier General Marmaduke will proceed with his command, by the best route, assume position, and take Righton hill, at daylight."

* * * * *

This plan of attack was fully concurred in by all my general officers, and the part assigned to each accepted with alacrity.

Between eleven and twelve o'clock at night, the troops began to move to their respective positions, whence to assault in the morning.

General Fagan detached a regiment from his brigade, and sent it forward to the right, on the lower Little Rock road, to occupy the attention of the enemy in the rifle-pits below the city, and to protect his flank, in case of an attack from that quarter.

Three detached companies of cavalry, under Captain Denson, were ordered to act as videttes in the plain south of the city, and to transmit to General Fagan rapid information of any attempt to flank him. His artillery was also sent forward on this, the only practicable road, with the hope that it might assist in creating a diversion, and thereby aid the general movement.

I took a position a little after daylight on the Grave-yard ridge, half a mile from the fortifications, a central point, there to await the development of the attack.

Soon after daylight, Brigadier General Marmaduke drove in the pickets of the enemy in his front and assaulted Righton fort. It is believed that a strong, vigorous and sudden attack on this fort would have been successful; but some delay occurring, a heavy force of the enemy appeared on his left flank and rear, and held him perfectly in check during the whole day. It was the peculiar duty of Brigadier General Walker to have prevented this movement on the part of the enemy, and, as represented by General Marmaduke, the same could have been easily accomplished. No satisfactory reason has been given by General Walker why this service was not rendered. This attack, being most remote, was not under my personal supervision, and was too distant for me to give specific orders.

The assault on the first line of rifle-pits in front of Hindman hill, was made at a few minutes after daylight. General Fagan, at the head of his brigade, charged gallantly over four lines, under a deadly fire from the rifle-pits and guns on his front, and a most disastrous enfilading fire from Grave-yard hill on the left, previous to the attack by General Price. Having driven the enemy from, and carried the fifth and last line of rifle-pits, the brave men, who had followed him thus far, overcome by sheer exhaustion, resulting from the inordinate exertion of their difficult charge, and the intense heat of the day, were unable to proceed further. A charge upon the fort was nevertheless attempted, and failed. The brigade thereupon took shelter behind the inner line of breastworks, anxiously awaiting assistance. This assistance never arrived. Major Gen. Price did not make his attack till after sunrise, and more than an hour after the time named in the order. As an explanation of this delay, his report states, that finding when

he had gotten within one and a half miles of the position he had been ordered to take, that his division would arrive upon the ground prematurely, he ordered a halt, and resumed his march at dawn of day. His troops, when brought into position and ordered forward, behaved magnificently, charging rifle-pits and breastworks without a falter, and taking the hill without a halt.

As soon as the works were carried, I rode rapidly into them. Finding the guns in the fort had been rendered useless, by the enemy, before being abandoned, I at once dispatched one of my staff to the rear, to bring up some artillery. Owing to the impracticability of the roads, this could not be effected in time.

Perceiving the position of the gallant Fagan and his command, I ordered Brigadier General Parsons, the only General officer present, to proceed at once to attack the Hindman fort in the rear. Everything was in confusion. Regiments and brigades mixed up indiscriminately, and the order was not attended to. Immediately afterwards, I sent an order to General Price to the same effect, and then returned to my headquarters.

Two or three hundred yards in the rear, I passed Brigadier General McRae, who had not joined his brigade since the assault. I ordered him at once to the fort.

It seems that General McRae was the officer designated by General Price to go to General Fagan's assistance. After much delay, he proceeded on this duty, but utterly failed to render the slightest aid, making no attempt to assault the hill.

Not having been advised of this order for General McRae, and being impatient of the delay, I proceeded again to the fort on Grave-yard hill, where I found General Parsons, with only three hundred or four hundred men of his brigade. He informed me that General McRae had been ordered to the relief of General Fagan. That officer was no where to be seen, while General Fagan, with greatly reduced force, was being assaulted and driven back by the enemy largely reinforced. Under these circumstances, at ten and a half, A. M., I ordered the troops to be withdrawn.

My retreat from Helena was effected in the most perfect order, and without the slightest demoralization of any kind.

My whole force engaged in this expedition amounted to seven thousand six hundred and forty-six (7,646.) My loss, as near as is ascertained, is one hundred and seventy-three (173) killed; six hundred and eighty-seven (687) wounded; seven hundred and seventy-six (776) missing. Total, sixteen hundred and thirty-six (1,636.) See reports of division and brigade commanders forwarded herewith.

I write this report with a deep pain. I commanded brave, gallant, and willing troops, and should have succeeded in the capture of Helena, for though the difficulties were very great, they were not insurmountable, and the misfortune of a failure was, in a very great measure, consequent on the men not being well in hand after success. Most of my loss in prisoners resulted in not restraining the men after the capture of Grave-yard hill, from advancing into the town, where they were taken mainly without resistance. If, instead of this, the

regiments and brigades had been reformed instantly, the capture of Hindman hill, and consequently of the town, would have been of easy occurrence.

I cannot close this report without expressing my obligations to his Excellency, Harris Flanigan, Governor of Arkansas, who accompanied me, and had my confidence during the whole campaign I owe to his cool, discriminating judgment, many valuable suggestions. His presence, confidence and zeal had no little influence on the spirit and energy of the Arkansas troops. He and Colonel Gordon Rear, Adjutant General of the State, acted as volunteer aids-de-camp on my staff during the battle. As the expedition failed, which should have succeeded, I refrain from all expressions of commendation, believing that the brave officers and men who distinguished themselves, will willingly forego the applause due to them, in consideration that our beloved country reaped no benefit from their exploits.

I have the honor to be, General,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS H. HOLMES,
Lieutenant General.

REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL PRICE.

HEADQUARTERS PRICE'S DIVISION,
Camp on Jones' Lake, July 13, 1863. }

To Captain JOHN W. HINSDALE, A. A. G.:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit to the Lieutenant General commanding, the following report of the part taken by this division in the attack made upon Helena on the 4th instant:

I left Jacksonport in obedience to his orders, on the 22nd day of June, with this division and Marmaduke's division of cavalry. My march was greatly impeded by the extraordinary rains, which beginning on the evening of the 24th June, and falling almost without intermission for four days, made the rivers, bayous and creeks, over which my route lay, and the bottoms and swamps through which it ran, almost impassable to troops, unprovided, as mine were, with the means of repairing roads and constructing bridges or rafts. I was however, enabled by the skill and energy of my officers, and by the willing endurance and laborious industry of my men, to surmount these unlooked for obstacles, and to reach, on the morning of the 3rd instant, a point within five miles of Helena.

At this point, Lieutenant General Holmes, having assumed the immediate command of all the troops before Helena, detached Marmaduke's division from my command, leaving me two brigades; the one of Arkansians, under Brigadier General Dandridge McRae, consisting of three regiments of infantry and a field battery, with twelve hundred and twenty-seven men present for duty; the other of Missourians, under Brigadier General M. Monroe Parsons, consisting of four regiments of infantry, a battalion of sharpshooters and a field battery, having in all, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight (1,868) men present for duty. These two brigades constituted this division.

The order of attack directed that I, "in command of McRae's and Parsons's brigades, should proceed by the best route, assume position, assault and take the grave yard hill at daylight." I made my dispositions, accordingly and moved at midnight, with Parsons's brigade in front.

As my route lay for the greater part of the way across abrupt hills and deep ravines, over which it was utterly impracticable to move my artillery during the darkness, I ordered the pieces to be left behind until daybreak, and armed details from each battery to accompany the infantry, in order to man the guns which I expected to capture.

Finding when I had gotten within a mile and a half of the position which I had been ordered to take, that my division would arrive upon the ground prematurely, I ordered a halt, during which the Lieutenant General commanding came to and remained with the division until the dawn of day, when the line of march was resumed. Then pushing forward rapidly, until my skirmishers had become engaged with

those of the enemy, and within half a mile of his works, the troops were formed into two columns of divisions, Parson's brigade occupying the right and moving in front.

The enemy's fire becoming somewhat sharp about this time, the guides who were conducting the columns took occasion to leave unperceived. Some confusion and consequent delay ensued, but another guide having been obtained, the head of the column soon occupied the position from which the assault was to be made. A brief halt was here ordered, to give the troops time to recover somewhat from the exhausting fatigues consequent upon their rapid march over a succession of almost precipitous and heavily wooded hills.

The order for the assault (as explained to the general officers and regimental commanders of the division the evening before) directed that General Parson's moving in front should halt the head of his column at the point from which he was to make the assault, until the head of General McRae's column should reach its position on the left, when both columns should advance simultaneously to the assault.

During the brief halt just alluded to, and just as I had ordered General McRae forward, the Lieutenant General commanding rode up and asked why the assault had not been made. I explained the facts to him, and thinking that time enough had elapsed for General McRae to get into position, I dispatched one of my staff to General Parsons to ascertain why he was not advancing. He replied that he was waiting for General McRae to get into position. Meanwhile General McRae had moved his brigade into position, but (owing to the difficulties and necessities of the ground) further to the left than had been originally ordered and explained to General Parsons, and with a high ridge interposing between it and Parson's brigade, so that the latter officer could not see that it had gotten into position. I immediately directed one of my staff officers to communicate these facts to General Parsons and to order him to make the assault without any further delay, as General McRae, to whom I had sent orders to that effect, would be advancing before he (General Parsons) could receive my order.

Both brigades moved forward on the instant, rapidly, steadily, unflinchingly, and in perfect order, under a storm of minnie balls, grape and cannister, which were poured upon them not only from the grave-yard hill in their front, but from the fortified hills upon the right and the left, both of which were in easy range.

The enemy gave way before the impetuous assault of the attacking columns, which entering the works almost simultaneously, planted the Confederate flag upon the summit of the grave-yard hill.

Each brigade had done its allotted duty with equal zeal, devotion and gallantry, and each is entitled to an equal share of the honor, which justly attaches to those who discharge their duty as these men did, fearlessly, well, and successfully.

Being in possession of the hill, and finding that the captured guns had been shot-wedged, I directed my chief of artillery to bring forward the pieces which I had left behind. This he did, as promptly as the difficulties of the ground would permit, but not until it was too

late for them to be used in the action. Meanwhile a heavy fire was concentrated upon the hill from the four fortified positions, which the enemy still continued to hold, and from the hill sides and ravines, under cover of which their sharpshooters delivered a well directed and very effective fire, whilst the gunboat, which lay in front of the town, kept up an unintermitting discharge of its heavy guns.

Perceiving at once that the surest way to relieve my men from the disastrous effects of this galling fire, was to aid General Fagan to take the enemy's works upon my right, and receiving information at the same time, that that gallant officer had been repulsed in every attempt to assault those works, I sent to General Parsons an order directing him to move his brigade forthwith to the reinforcement of General Fagan. He replied to the officer, by whom I sent the order, that General McRae (who was by his side at the time) would, with my permission, go to the assistance of General Fagan, whilst his (Parsons) brigade, being the stronger of the two, would hold the graveyard hill. Before this reply was brought back to me I sent an other of my staff, by direction of the Lieutenant General commanding, to deliver to General Parsons an order similar to the one already sent. General Parsons' reply having been meanwhile received, another order was sent directing him to hold the hill, and General McRae to reinforce General Fagan, as speedily as possible, with his brigade.

It soon became obvious, however, that both brigades had been so much weakened by their heavy losses in killed and wounded, and particularly in prisoners, (the most of the latter having been captured in the immediate vicinity of the town whither they had gone without orders from me) and by the straggling of those whom thirst and the intense heat of the day overcame, or who had become disheartened by the failure of the other assaulting columns, that I could not send any effective aid to General Fagan, without too greatly endangering my own position. It was equally obvious that, unless such aid could be promptly sent to General Fagan, the general attack upon Helena must fail. It was under these circumstances that I received an order from the Lieutenant General commanding to withdraw my division. In compliance with this order my troops were withdrawn to a point about four miles from Helena, where they rested for the night, and resumed the march hither on the morning of the 5th.

The Lieutenant General commanding was himself a witness of the conduct of my division. He saw the alacrity with which they advanced to the positions to which they had been assigned. He knows the steadiness and unfaltering courage with which they moved, in the midst of a deadly fire, over deep ravines and precipitous hills, obstructed with felled timber, to, into, and over the works which they had been ordered to take, driving everything before them. He himself was a witness of the undaunted bravery and enduring constancy with which, animated by his own inspiring example and gallant bearing, they stood unshaken in the very centre of that unceasing fire which was hurled against them from gunboat, from flats, and from rifle-pits. I am sure that he will pay them that tribute of praise to which their courage and endurance entitle them. The

accompanying reports of Brigadier Generals McRae and Parsons will explain in detail the part taken by their respective brigades, and point out to the Lieutenant General commanding such of their officers and men as are particularly deserving of mention. I have not been able to obtain perfectly accurate reports of the casualties in this division, but these may be stated approximately as follows:

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
McRae's brigade.....	46	168	133	347
Parsons' brigade.....	59	336	369	764
	105	504	503	1,111

I will forward detailed reports of these casualties as soon as the lists can be carefully revised. The separation of the command will necessarily entail some delay in the revision of them.

The admirable conduct of Brigadier General Parsons, not only upon the field, but upon the march, merits my earnest commendation, whilst his skill and gallantry, as well as his long and uninterrupted active service as brigadier general, first in the Missouri State Guard, and more recently in the provisional army of the Confederate States, are, in my opinion, worthy of recognition on the part of the Government.

I must also commend the excellent discipline which General McRae maintains at all times in his brigade; the marked good sense and energy with which he conducted its march to Helena; the promptitude with which he has always obeyed my commands, and the earnest efforts which he made to reinforce General Fagan towards the close of the attack.

I have not in my former reports mentioned the officers of my staff, though most of them have been eminently deserving of praise for gallant and meritorious conduct upon more than one hard fought field. Justice requires that I should not permit the present occasion to pass without placing upon record my sense and appreciation of the worth and merits of those of them, at least, who participated in the present movement.

Major Thomas L. Snead, senior assistant adjutant general of my command, to whom I have been often indebted for vigorous support in hours of perilous trial, (apart from the intelligent and faithful performance of the responsible and onerous duties of his office,) surpassed himself this day in the intrepid manner with which he bore himself throughout the conflict, rallying the troops again and again and urging them forward to the scene of action.

In this work, under the hottest fire of the enemy, and until we had swept their entrenchments and carried the hill, he was faithfully, fearlessly and gallantly assisted by Major L. A. Maclean, A. A. G.

My thanks are due to my aids-de-camp, Lieutenant Richard T. Morrison and Lieutenant Celsus Price, for their willing assistance, promptly rendered upon this, as upon other hotly contested fields.

I commend all of these officers to the Lieutenant General commanding, and through him to the President, for promotion, on account of gallant and meritorious conduct in the field.

Acting Engineers John Mhoon, of Alabama, and D. C. Cage, of Mississippi, not only deserve honorable mention for their gallantry upon the field, but for the skill and energy with which they overcame the difficulties that obstructed my road from Cache river to Helena. I have repeatedly recommended Mr. Mhoon for appointment in the engineer corps, and again respectfully urge the President to recognize the worth of so excellent an officer. Mr. Cage's services demand a similar recognition.

Nor should the less conspicuous, but equally useful, services of Major Isaac Brinker and Major John Reid be passed over in silence. To the practical good sense and untiring and well directed energy of the former, as chief quartermaster of my division, I am greatly indebted for the accomplishment of the march to Helena and back to this point; whilst the latter, as chief commissary of subsistence, has, in spite of many difficulties, continued to subsist the troops both regularly and well.

Lieutenant Colonel Clay Taylor, chief of artillery and acting chief of ordnance, discharged the onerous duties of both those offices with laborious fidelity and to my entire satisfaction.

To my chief surgeon, Thomas D. Wooten, to surgeon William M. McPheeters, and to assistant field purveyor R. M. Slaughter, my constant thanks and commendation are due for the sedulous manner in which they have at all times devoted themselves to the sick and wounded, but never more humanely or more conspicuously than upon this occasion.

These gentlemen tell me that they owe their grateful acknowledgements to the Rev. Mr. Marvin for the very important services which he rendered at their hospitals, not only offering the consolations of his holy office to the dying, but ministering assiduously to the wants of the wounded.

Major John Tyler, C. S. A., acting, for want of an appropriate command, as volunteer aid-de-camp, remained by my side in view of special contingencies, which might fittingly task his valuable accomplishments.

Mr. Charles T. Perrie, volunteer aid-de-camp, is also entitled to my thanks for the activity which he displayed at the opening of the attack.

I would refer particularly to the gallant conduct and bearing of Mr. Gustavus A. Dyes, clerk in the office of the assistant adjutant general, and of orderly Daniel M. Kavanaugh, both of whom have by their conduct in this field, merited commissions in the army, and both of whom have borne themselves equally well in more important battle fields.

Major Henry M. Clark, assistant inspector general, was detained from the field by serious illness; Major E. C. Cabell, paymaster, by duties elsewhere.

I am, Captain, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
STERLING PRICE,
Major General.

REPORT OF GENERAL PARSONS.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH BRIGADE, PRICE'S DIVISION, }
July 10, 1863. }

Major T. L. SNEAD, A. A. G. :

MAJOR: I have the honor to report the following as the part taken by my brigade in the battle of Helena, on the 4th instant:

On the evening of the 3d of July the army bivouacked on the Little Rock and Helena road, and six miles from the latter place. It having been determined to attack the enemy at dawn next morning, the disposition of the troops for the various points of attack was immediately made by the Lieutenant General, commanding the army, and the Major General, commanding this division. The assault and capture of the enemy's works on Grave-yard hill was assigned to the Major General commanding Brigadier General McRae's brigade (Arkansas,) and my brigade (Missouri volunteers.) This position was, by the Lieutenant General commanding, believed to be the strongest of all the enemy's works, and the key to all his defences. He was particularly solicitous that it should be carried and held at all hazards. It was represented to contain six heavy pieces, protected by earth-works and a line of rifle-pits on its front, and extremely inaccessible on account of the numerous sharp ridges, steep ravines, and felled timber in its front and flank. These works were situated between Fort Hindman on the right, and another fort on the left, both being within rifle range of the position to be assailed by my command, and supported in its rear by another fort between it and the town of Helena, and Fort Curtis obliquely to the right and rear of the work to be assaulted. All these fortifications were situated upon high, steep hills, with deep ravines and felled timber between, rendering the rapid and orderly movement of the troops very difficult.

At twelve o'clock on the night of the 3d, the division was put in motion, my brigade in advance, which moved in the following order, viz: first, battalion of sharpshooters, Major Pindall commanding, in front; second, the ninth regiment, Colonel White; third, the eighth regiment, Colonel Burns commanding; fourth, the seventh regiment, Colonel Lewis commanding; fifth, the tenth regiment, Colonel Picket commanding. After moving on the main road about two miles, the column diverged to the left, along an obscure path for two miles further, and then left this path to the left, and followed up a rivulet, until arriving within about one and a half miles of Grave-yard hill. Day having not yet dawned, a halt was ordered, to await sufficient light, during which time my command was ordered to "load." I had previously thrown out well to the front, as skirmishers, Major Pindall's battalion of sharpshooters, to which command was attached Captain Biscoe's company of sharpshooters, from McRae's brigade. Taking advantage of this halt, I particularly instructed in person the commandants of regiments as to the plan of attack, and charged them that in the event if any of their division should become disordered in

carrying the works, that they should be promptly reformed, and, as the orders of my superiors extended only to the capture of Grave-yard hill, that no further movement should be made without orders. I deemed this precaution absolutely necessary, as it was impossible for either myself or staff to ride over the rough ground on which we moved, and consequently orders could not be transmitted with the usual rapidity.

At daylight the march was resumed, and in a short time we encountered the steep ridges and deep ravines, which rendered the movement very slow and fatiguing. At five o'clock, A. M., Major Pindall encountered the enemy's pickets, about half a mile from the fortifications. Sharp skirmishing ensued, and finally they were driven in. I ordered the column to form divisions at half distance, and move steadily forward in that order. The enemy now commenced throwing shells and grape upon the column, killing and wounding about twenty men; but no signs of disorder or fear were apparent—they moved steadily and firmly forward. By this time Pindall's sharpshooters had arrived within musket range of the enemy's works, and from behind stumps and logs, and the branches of felled trees, were delivering an effective fire upon the gunners of the enemy's artillery.

Upon arriving within three hundred yards of the line of rifle-pits, I again halted the columns, to allow rest, and to enable Brigadier General McRae to move upon my left and take position, as previously agreed upon between that officer and myself, for the purpose of making a combined assault upon the works. So soon as it was announced to me that he was in position, I ordered the "forward" at double-quick, to which officers and men responded with alacrity. Just at this moment a heavy fire was opened on my right flank from a rifle-pit, distant about one hundred and fifty yards; also the shell and grape from Fort Hindman was showered down upon the column. This was the critical moment. I watched with an anxious eye to see whether my battalions would falter or break under this flank attack, but they moved gallantly on, unheeding the murderous missiles now being hurled on them both from front and flank. Turning my attention to the front, the head of the two columns (McRae's and mine) were beyond the rifle-pits, and in an instant White's battle-flag, waving over the works, announced that Grave-yard hill was won.

Thirty men of Tilden's battery having been armed and sent forward with Colonel White's regiment, under command of Lieutenant Lessneur, for the purpose of working the enemy's guns, upon their capture, this officer immediately took them in charge, but finding shot wedged in the bore, and the enemy having taken away the worms, he could not work them. He and his men resumed their muskets, and fought as infantry throughout the battle.

As previously ordered, the commandants of regiments proceeded to restore order in their commands, wherever confusion had occurred. Just at this time the Lieutenant General commanding arrived upon the hill, and gave orders directly to one of my Colonels to attack and carry the fort in the direction of the town, and he, proceeding to execute the order, the other commandants, understanding it to be a gen-

eral movement towards the town, advanced in that direction, some portions of regiments rushing into town, and even to the river's bank. All the way from Grave-yard hill to the town, and through it, those devoted troops were exposed to a fatal cross-fire from the enemy's artillery and musketry. It was here that my loss was the heaviest; not more than half of those that went in that direction returned—the remainder were killed, wounded, and taken prisoners.

From time to time the enemy made repeated assaults on Grave-yard hill, but was always successfully repulsed. Whilst General McRae and myself were thus holding it under the terrific storm of bullets hurled upon us, both from the right and from the left, he suggested that if I with my command would hold the position, he would assault Fort Hindman in the rear, which General Fagan was then engaging in front. This arrangement having been agreed upon, he moved with what troops he had at his disposal to the assault; but, being assailed by the guns from the fort, by the musketry from the rifle-pits, and in flank by the heavy artillery from the gunboat, he was compelled to withdraw his gallant command into the timber for shelter.

During these operations against Fort Hindman, the enemy was continually shelling my position from the fort upon my left, and repeatedly advanced against me, but was each time repulsed. General Fagan having retired from the assault upon Fort Hindman, no troops were now upon the field except my own. The enemy moved upon me in front and upon both flanks, and opened a furious cross-fire of artillery from right and left. I still maintained my position, driving back the enemy's infantry wherever assaulted. At a quarter past ten o'clock, A. M., I received an order from the Major General commanding to "retire." I immediately sent orders to commandants of regiments and Pindall's battalion to withdraw their commands in good order, and fight the enemy as they retired. At half-past ten, A. M., I withdrew my command from the field.

It gives me great pain to report the heavy losses in brave officers and men that my brigade sustained on that bloody field. The following commissioned officers of the ninth regiment fell killed on the field: Major Sandford, Captain Launius, and Lieutenant Spencer. The following were wounded: Colonel White, Adjutant Thomas, Lieutenants Kelly, Essleman, and Kerr.

In Pindall's battalion were wounded: Captains Cake and Phillips, and Lieutenant Armstrong.

In the eighth regiment were killed: Lieutenants Foster and Farley. Wounded: Lieutenant Colonel Murray, Captains M'Rill, Bradley, and Johnson; Lieutenants Pierce, McBride, Gibson, Dudley, Good, Stevens, and Wetherford.

In the seventh regiment were killed: Captains Cocke and Perry. Wounded: Lieutenant Colonel Cummings, Adjutant Waisburg, Captains Gillett, Steinmons, and McGeo; Lieutenants Austin, Anderson, Weims, White, Strong, Wall, Finley, West, Gonce, and Bronaugh. Colonel Lewis captured.

In the tenth regiment were wounded: Lieutenants Wright, Baker, and Hanley.

The following is a summary of my losses in each regiment, battalion, and the artillery detachment:

Seventh regiment—	Killed,	-	-	-	-	17
	Wounded,	-	-	-	-	126
	Missing,	-	-	-	-	54—197
Eighth regiment—	Killed,	-	-	-	-	14
	Wounded,	-	-	-	-	82
	Missing,	-	-	-	-	67—163
Ninth regiment—	Killed,	-	-	-	-	7
	Wounded,	-	-	-	-	53— 60
Tenth regiment—	Killed,	-	-	-	-	11
	Wounded,	-	-	-	-	41
	Missing,	-	-	-	-	237—289
Pindall's shps'trs—	Killed,	-	-	-	-	9
	Wounded,	-	-	-	-	26
	Missing,	-	-	-	-	8— 43
Artillery detach't—	Killed,	-	-	-	-	1
	Wounded,	-	-	-	-	8
	Missing,	-	-	-	-	3— 12
Total loss,						764

Recapitulation.

Killed,	-	-	-	-	-	59
Wounded,	-	-	-	-	-	336
Missing,	-	-	-	-	-	369—764

It will thus be seen that every regiment, battalion and squad of my brigade was actively engaged with the enemy, and that each sustained its proportionate of the heavy losses above reported—Captain Tilden's battery not having been taken into action, it being impracticable to do so on account of obstructions in the line of march.

While the country will long mourn the loss of the gallant officers and men who fell as martyrs to our cause, the historians of this revolution will record them as "the bravest of the brave." For their gallant comrades who lie now disabled from their wounds, the officers and soldiers of this brigade feel the deepest solicitude, and cherish the hope that they will soon recover and return to their commands, to give the country more examples of unprecedented coolness and daring.

To mention the name of any particular officer or soldier as having distinguished himself for gallantry above his fellows, would be to do injustice, for the brigade as a whole fully sustained its well-earned reputation, and given additional evidence of the disinterested devotion of Missourians to the cause of their country—showing, as heretofore, that they are always among the first in the breach, and the last to leave it. I am indebted to my aids, Captain Edwards and Lieutenant Chesnut, for the prompt and untiring energy with which they assisted me in the engagement. Major Monroe, my brigade quartermaster, and Major Ruthvan, my brigade commissary, deserve great praise for the activity with which they discharged the duties of their respective departments. Chief Surgeon Bear, with the regi-

mental surgeons and their assistants, were on the field, and by their prompt professional attention to the wounded, saved many valuable lives. A report in detail of the killed, wounded, and missing, will be forwarded at an early day to the proper department.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

M. M. PARSONS,
Brigadier General commanding.

Official :

THOMAS L. SNEAD, *Major and A. A. G.*

REPORT OF GENERAL MCRAE.

HEADQUARTERS MCRAE'S BRIGADE, July 14, 1863.

To Major THOMAS L. SNEAD,
Assistant Adjutant General Price's Division:

MAJOR: I submit the following report of the action of my brigade in the assault upon the town of Helena on the 4th instant.

On the 3rd orders were issued from district headquarters for General Parsons' and my brigade to assault and take the fort upon Grave-yard hill at daylight upon the morning of the 4th. By agreement, General Parsons' brigade was to move in front until he got into position, so as to enable him to rush past the fortification, by way of the ravine south of the Grave-yard hill, and then charge the fort in reverse. As soon as General Parsons was in position, my brigade was to move to the left and charge the works in front, simultaneously with the assault to be made by General Parsons. The evening before the assault General Parsons and myself had been furnished with five guides. We took up the line of march at twelve o'clock at night. Three of these guides went with General Parsons. I also sent to his front one company of sharpshooters, under command of Captain Biscoe, of Hart's regiment—Captain Biscoe being familiar with the country. Before daylight our column was halted, to await until the other attacking columns were in position. After forming into columns of divisions, we again moved on. As soon as the enemy's fire opened, General Parsons sent back for another guide, those sent with him having deserted him. I sent one, and the one who remained with me shortly after left. At this time we were upon the ridges, three in number, each having a fort upon it and firing, and in appearance were exactly alike. Here I halted for a short time, in doubt as to the route. Finding the correct route, we pushed on upon the crest of the hill to where the timber was cleared away in front of the rifle-pits, and then crossed to the north side of the ridge and moved up to a position that I thought near enough to make a charge; but between my position and the work that was to be carried there was a deep ravine, just in front of the fort. As soon as the command was massed into position, a general rush was made into the fort, and the works were carried. This assault was made from the north. The enemy were driven from the works and pursued into the verge of the town. About this time General Parsons' brigade entered into the fort, he having charged about the same time as my brigade, thus rendering the capture of the position certain; for, had our assault failed, he would have been so close that we could not have failed. Here I would state that, while moving along the north side of Grave-yard hill, my command was exposed not only to the fire of the fort and rifle pits in front, but also to the fort north of Grave-yard hill, which fort was not attacked, and to whose fire my command was exposed. While moving along, I discovered a battery of field-pieces

were being moved to the rear, so as to completely enfilade my command, and being in point blank range for canister. Before marching I had armed Captain Marshall's company of artillery with muskets, and moved it along in rear of my column, so that, in the event we captured the fort, I would be prepared to work the guns. I now was compelled to use this company as sharpshooters, and deployed them, ordering them to approach as close as possible to the battery and prevent it getting into position, which they accomplished in a very gallant manner. As soon as the works were carried, I at once returned to where I had deployed Marshall's company, and ordered Captain Marshall to call in his men and take charge of the guns and work them. While giving these orders, Lieutenant General Holmes rode up and ordered me at once to the assistance of General Fagan, who was attacking the fort upon the south of Grave-yard hill. I at once went to the fort and ordered my officers to assemble their men, but, before they were able to do so, General Holmes again, in a peremptory manner, ordered me to the assistance of General Fagan. I had not more than two hundred men with me. With them I charged down the hill, aiming to assault the north front of the fort, but when I arrived at the foot of the hill, the fire of the enemy was so withering that, with the force I had, it was madness to attempt to scale the hill, the hollow being raked by artillery situated opposite its mouth, and completely enfiladed with rifle-pits, in point blank range. I therefore deployed my men, and commenced firing upon the rifle-pits and works, which were being attacked by General Fagan, aiming to make as great a diversion as possible.

I remained here until I was informed that the enemy had retaken the works on Grave-yard hill, when I sent Captain Cobbs, of Hart's regiment, with his company, to General Fagan, and to inform him that I was unable to attack the works in front, being now exposed to fire in rear, as well as flank. I crossed over the narrow ridge in front of the fort attacked by General Fagan, and the fire was so great and severe that the men were compelled to cross this ridge singly. When I reached the crest of the hill I discovered General Fagan's men in a rifle-pit in front of the main works, and they seemed too few, even reinforced with what men I had, to accomplish anything, and within a short time I saw them rush out of the rifle-pits into a deep gorge immediately in their rear. Discovering the enemy moving around the crest of the hill, and fearing that I would be surrounded, I retreated into the ravine between the two forts attacked, and re-organized what command I had with me, and then moved to the rear, forcing every straggler that I found to fall into the ranks. The first field officer that I met was Colonel Hawthorne, at some huts where some of General Fagan's wounded were, and in a short time General Fagan came up. After moving a short distance from here I met General Holmes.

I must here call your attention to the fact that the information concerning the localities, strength of the enemy, &c., was very erroneous. The ground over which we moved was almost entirely impracticable; the crest of the hill so narrow that it would have

been murder to have attempted to have assaulted along it; the sides of the hill full of gullies, with almost perpendicular sides, and that covered with fallen timber, so placed as most to impede an approach; the day one of the hottest; our column not only exposed to a storm of shell, but for a long way (say six hundred yards) to a fire of canister and grape, front and flank, as well as from sharpshooters from rifle-pits, which were placed by the enemy to protect every possible approach.

Under all this, I am proud to say that my little brigade of less than three regiments, and these small, moved steadily, without faltering, upon the foe, protected by fortifications and artillery; and the hill, up which the final rush was made, was so steep and slippery that it was almost impracticable. For all that, with a wild shout they rushed up it, drove the concealed enemy from his position, and seized his works.

I am happy and proud to state that the officers and men in my brigade did their whole duty, and when all did so well a distinction is difficult. As for my field officers—that they did their duty, it needs but to state that, of nine who went into the battle, six were wounded, two mortally.

Attention is called to the gallant conduct of Colonel Hart, who led his men to the assault, and, when in the fort, seized one of the enemy's guns and fired it against them.

Here also fell mortally wounded Lieutenant W. F. Rector, adjutant of Hart's regiment, whose gallantry and undaunted bravery signalized him in the assault.

Major Davie, gallantly leading his men, fell shot through the thigh in front of the fort.

Captain Robinson, acting major, fell mortally wounded in front of his men.

There also fell mortally wounded the brave, the zealous Major Martin, of Hart's regiment, as also Major Stephenson, of Gause's regiment. There also fell Captain Garland, of Glenn's regiment; Lieutenant Eppes, of Gause's regiment, than whom a better man or braver soldier has not offered up his life during the war.

Colonels Glenn and Gause and Lieutenant Colonels Rogan and Hicks deserve special mention for the cool and daring manner in which they led their men.

Lieutenant Crabtree, of Green's regiment, displayed the greatest intrepidity.

Sergeant Champ, company A, of Hart's regiment, deserves the greatest credit for gallantry, rushing in advance of his regiment in the charge.

Color Sergeant Garland, of Glenn's regiment, also deserves special mention. He advanced his regimental colors to the front, and maintained his position through the assault, his colors being torn into ribbons.

My thanks are due my staff for efficient aid rendered me during the action, especially to Lieutenant John McKoy, my A. A. I. G.

In conclusion, I will state that I left the field without orders.

Having been ordered by General Holmes to the part of the field upon which General Fagan's brigade fought, I was unable to communicate with Major General Price, but when he left all effort upon our part had ceased. My loss is as follows: Killed, forty six; wounded, one hundred and sixty-eight; missing, one hundred and thirty-three; total, three hundred and forty-seven. For further particulars reference is made to list sent herewith, which is respectfully submitted.

Respectfully,

D. McRAE, *Brigadier General.*

Official :

THOMAS L. SNEAD, *Major and A. A. G.*

REPORT OF GENERAL FAGAN.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, &c.,
Camp at Searcy, Arkansas, }
July 21, 1863. }

Major W. B. BLAIR, *A. A. A. General:*

Headquarters District of Arkansas, &c.:

MAJOR: I have the honor to report as follows, in regard to the part taken by my brigade in the attack on Helena, upon the 4th instant.

On the evening of the 3d instant, at dark, I ordered Colonel Brooks, with his regiment, one section of Etter's battery of light artillery, commanded by Lieutenant John C. Arnett, and three companies of cavalry, commanded by Captain Denson, to move to the front in support of the cavalry, then within three miles of the town of Helena. About eleven o'clock at night, with the three remaining regiments, commanded respectively by Colonels King, Hawthorne and Bell, and Blocker's battery of light artillery, commanded by Captain W. D. Blocker, I moved forward on the road towards Helena. On joining Colonel Brooks, where the old hill road leaves the Little Rock road, I ordered him to advance *at once* with his command, on the latter road, to attract and engage the attention of the enemy, south of the town, and hold his forces in the rifle-pits on the river. At the same time, I ordered Col. Hawthorne, whose regiment was in advance, to lead the brigade forward on the hill road. This was promptly complied with, and the brigade moved on without interruption, until within one mile of the outer works of the enemy. At this point, the road was completely filled with felled timber, the largest forest growth intermingling and overlapping its whole length, whilst on either side precipitous and impassable ravines were found running up even to the very entrenchments of the enemy. It was utterly impossible to move my artillery or ammunition train along this road; the obstacles were so great, indeed, that I was under the necessity of directing every officer of my command to dismount, and proceed on foot—a dire necessity, which subsequent events gave occasion seriously to deplore. After crawling through the interstices of the closely jutting limbs and boughs, and climbing over the thickly matted timber, for one mile, my line of skirmishers, who had been ordered by me not to fire, came within sight of the enemy. I went to the front, and could plainly see that the enemy was on the alert, and evidently expecting and awaiting an attack. The order of the Lieutenant General commanding was to assault the fortifications with the several attacking columns, *precisely* at daylight on the morning of the 4th. Not having been apprised of the obstructions in the road, I had made no arrangements to remove them. The limited time to daylight would not allow of an *attempt* even to take my artillery along. It was ordered to remain in the road, where the obstructions were first met with.

To conform to orders, it was necessary for me to move with the utmost celerity. Freeing myself of everything except my column of infantry, I pushed forward with all the haste in my power.

At daylight I reached and attacked the enemy in his works. Colonel Hawthorne being in advance, was hurried rapidly into line on the right of the road, which led directly up to the fort on Hindman's hill. He at once engaged the enemy, who occupied their extreme or outer line of rifle-pits. Bell's regiment emerged next from the confused mass of felled timber, and coming up, was also double-quicked into line on the left of the road, engaging as they came into position the entrenched forces of the enemy, over against them. King's regiment brought up the rear. He rapidly threw his men into position, and was ordered by me immediately to the support of Colonel Hawthorne. My entire force was now engaged. The assault upon the rifle-pits was made from both the right and left of the road. Never did men behave with greater steadiness and gallantry than did the troops of those three regiments. Over the heavy timber, the deep gorges, and the precipitous banks, they moved. Over opposite to them ran the long line of fortifications, towards which they moved with eager, anxious steps. Cowering behind their strong works, the enemy beheld their advance with consternation. Still on they moved, unhesitatingly, amid the "leaden rain and iron hail." The gorge is passed, the ascent of the steep acclivity is nearly gained, the red line of rifle-pits looms up clearly amid the uncertain light and haze of dawn. With a shout of triumph they rush towards it, and the enemy are driven pell mell from one row of the rifle-pits to another. Up to this time there had been no attack at any other point. Daybreak had come and gone, and still the guns of my brigade and those of the enemy were the only ones that interrupted the stillness of the morning. Owing to this my brigade was exposed to a constant and galling enfilading fire from the works on Grave-yard hill. This exposure, combined with the close and constant fire in our front, was most trying to the men. Their numbers were being rapidly decimated, not only by the fire of the enemy, but by extreme exhaustion, occasioned by their scaling the steepest of hills, made almost impassable by quantities of timber cut down, which was of itself an almost insurmountable barrier to our advance. We reached and took possession of the fourth tier of rifle-pits. Now it was that the column commanded by Major General Price, (Parson's and McRae's brigades,) charged the works on Grave-yard hill, gallantly driving the enemy before them, and taking possession of their fortifications and artillery. There remained yet one row of entrenchments between my brigade and the fort on Hindman's hill. I ordered a charge. My men, though thoroughly exhausted and worn, answered with a shout, and sprang forward most gallantly. This being the inner and last line of works between us and the enemy, of course was defended with great stubbornness. It was of no avail. My men sprang forward bravely and defiantly, and after a severe contest, succeeded in driving out the enemy, who fled, crowding back into the frowning fort, and under cover of its heavy guns. The fort yet remains to be taken. Of all the

many obstacles and threatening fortifications that opposed our advance that morn, there only remained the fort. All other obstacles, natural and artificial, had been overcome—rugged and almost impassable ravines—the steepest and most broken hill sides, *abatis*, and line after line of breastworks, had been passed and left behind. Before us there only remained the fort, and the plain on which it was built. Notwithstanding the reduced condition of my command and the exhaustion of those yet remaining, I ordered a charge upon the fort. My Colonels, King, Hawthorne and Bell, did all in their power to encourage the men to the attack. The effort was made, but the prostrate condition of my command prevented success, and after losing in the attempt several gallant officers and many brave men, I formed again in rear of the inner line of rifle-pits, whilst the guns of the fort continued to pour forth a furious fire.

It was now verging on eleven o'clock in the day. More than three hours before, the guns on Grave-yard hill had been taken by our friends, and there seemed no obstacle in the way of their victorious march. Eagerly did we look to see their column coming to our aid, and at first with the most undoubting hope and confidence, but less confidently as hour after hour wore on, and still they made not their appearance. Time wore on, the pleasant morning deepened into the sultriest and hottest of days. The thinned ranks of my regiments became thinner and thinner each moment. The guns of the enemy (not more than one hundred or one hundred and fifty yards distant), were telling sadly against us, whilst the heat, the want of water, and the toil, were no mean auxiliaries. Still, the brave men left stood manfully up to the discharge of their duty. At this time, written orders were received from Lieutenant General Holmes, directing that I withdraw my troops from the field, and fall back to Allan Polk's, (six miles in the rear.) We retired from the field, and fell back slowly to that point. It was in the last assault upon the fort that Major Cocke, of Hawthorne's regiment, received a severe wound in the shoulder. I would make especial mention of this brave and accomplished officer—his daring was conspicuous throughout the engagement.

Here, also, the much beloved Captain Walton Watkins, whilst most gallantly leading his company over the enemy's works, fell. It has never been my lot to witness more gallantry and more determined courage than displayed by this young officer on that day. We mourn the loss of other brave and true officers who fell during the engagement.

Of the conduct of my colonels, too much praise cannot be said. Brooks, King, Hawthorne and Bell, each and every one, did his whole duty. Brooks' command being on the lower road, was not immediately under my eye, but of the part taken by him I respectfully refer you to his report. He succeeded entirely in carrying out the orders he received to the letter. His report will show the number of prisoners captured by him, as well as the amount of property taken and brought from the field or destroyed.

The position assigned to Colonel King threw him perhaps on that

ground most difficult of all to get over. Had it not been for the determined character of this brave young colonel, his regiment, perhaps, would not have been advanced over all the difficulties he met with.

Major Dillard and Adjutant Bourne, of same regiment, (King's,) deserve much praise for the assistance they rendered Colonel King.

Colonel Hawthorne was constantly to the front, cheering his men on from one success to another. When orders came from Lieutenant General Holmes to abandon the field, Colonel Hawthorne remained with a small number of his men, engaging the enemy, until the last of the army had left the field, and retired beyond the high hills which lay between them and danger.

Colonel Bell and Lieutenant Colonel Johnson, same regiment, with a large number of his officers and over one hundred of his men, were captured by the enemy, in an attempt to enter the fort from the south side. The loss of Colonel Bell is a serious one to us. It affords me pleasure to bear testimony to his distinguished gallantry and daring.

Major Blackwell, (Bell's regiment,) was entrusted by me with an important part on the field, and is entitled to my thanks for the successful manner in which he performed it.

Major B. T. Duval, quartermaster on my staff, is entitled to my thanks for his constant attention to every duty on the march from Little Rock. He was with me on the field, and by his coolness and good judgment, was enabled to render me important assistance up to the time of the withdrawal of my troops from the field.

Captain Wyatt C. Thomas, A. A. General of the brigade, was, as usual at his post. The conduct of this young officer has often before won for him "honorable mention." On this field, he was constantly with, and cheering the troops forward. His bravery and gallantry justify especial mention.

My A. D. C., Captain Albert Belding, always eager to discharge every duty, was sent by me, at daylight, with important orders to Colonel Brooks, some distance from me on my right. I was consequently deprived of the valuable assistance his quickness and daring so well qualify him to render on the field.

Captain John B. Howell, my ordnance officer, was ordered to remain constantly with his ammunition train, which, as above stated, had to be left in the rear. This deprived me of the immediate services of this gallant officer.

The officers of my staff, Major B. F. Fall, brigade commissary, Mr. James H. Tucker, volunteer A. D. C., and Mr. J. W. Paul, acting Inspector General, are all entitled to my thanks for the assistance rendered me during the engagement.

The aggregate force engaged against Fort Hindman and the defences in front of it, was thirteen hundred and thirty-nine.

I have, Major, the honor to be,

With much respect, your obedient servant,

J. F. FAGAN, *Brigadier General.*

NOTE.—A correct list of the casualties in the brigade will be rendered in three or four days.

F.

REPORT OF COLONEL KING.

HEADQUARTERS KING'S REGIMENT ARKANSAS INFANTRY,
Camp at Searcy, July 22, 1863.

Captain WYATT C. THOMAS:

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by my regiment in the late battle fought at Helena, on the 4th instant.

On the night of the 3d instant I took up the line of march at eleven o'clock, taking the road leading to Helena; and when within about ten miles of that place, I, with Colonels Hawthorne and Bell, led by General Fagan, took the road leading into town by the way of Hindman hill. When arriving within about three-quarters of a mile of the hill, we found the road so blockaded by fallen timber that it was impossible for anything but infantry to pass, and it was with great difficulty that the men could get through it at all. By the time I got my regiment to the open road, skirmishing commenced by Colonel Hawthorne, who was moving in front. I immediately moved my regiment up at a double-quick, arriving at the scene of action about day-light. I was immediately ordered by General Fagan to take position on the right of Colonel Hawthorne, who had formed line of battle, and was skirmishing with the enemy in the *rifle-pits*, which were immediately in front of us. I moved my regiment as ordered, taking position on the crest of a hill overlooking the town, where I was exposed to a galling fire from the enemy's rifle-pits or breastworks, which were about one hundred and fifty yards in front of us. By the time I got my men well up and in line, I received an order from General Fagan to charge the works in front of me, which I did; but, as you yourself know, the ground was so *very rough* that it was impossible to move rapidly. After scrambling over and under the fallen timber, across a ravine, that I would at any other time, or under any other circumstances, have considered impossible to make my way through, and at last up the side of a hill that was so steep the men had to pull themselves up by the bushes, we reached the first line of breastworks, and drove the enemy back. Here we were met with a terrific fire, not only from the inner line of works and an enfilading fire from our left, but from the fort on the hill in front of us, near Hindman's house, which was about two hundred yards distant from us, and also from the battery on what is known as Graveyard hill.

In this position we kept up a heavy fire, moving forward from one line of works to another, until we reached the inner line of the enemy, taking refuge in their forts. I then received an order from General Fagan to send a small force round to the right of my position, to see that the enemy did not flank us; also, to move my regiment to the left, where I found Colonel Hawthorne, with his regiment and a portion of Colonel Bell's, behind the last line of works, which was about one hundred yards from the first line. Here it was we found that it

was impossible for our men to go further. Many of them had been left, so exhausted that they could not go on.

While in this situation, General Fagan ordered me to take the fort, but the men were so exhausted that most of them were unfit for further service.

We remained behind the breastworks, keeping up a steady fire at the fort, until about eleven o'clock, A. M., at which time we were ordered off the field.

I cannot speak too highly of the most of my officers and men throughout the fight, particularly of the gallant Major Dillard and Adjutant Bourne, who were in every charge, and cheering the men on at all times.

My loss was as follows: Twelve killed, forty-six wounded, and twenty missing.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

J. P. KING,
Colonel commanding regiment.

REPORT OF COLONEL BROOKS.

HEADQUARTERS BROOKS' REGIMENT,
Camp near Cotton Plant, July 10, 1863.

Captain WYATT C. THOMAS,
Assistant Adjutant General Second Brigade:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the following as the part taken by my command in the engagement of the 4th instant at Helena:

At dusk on the 3rd, in compliance with instructions from Brigadier General Fagan, I moved forward with my regiment and one section of Etter's light artillery, Lieutenant J. C. Arnett commanding, to the support of the cavalry, then within three miles of the enemy.

At half-past one o'clock, A. M., on the morning of the 4th, I received orders from Brigadier General Fagan to advance on the Little Rock road with my regiment, Captains Denson's, Miller's and _____ companies of cavalry, and the section of artillery; make a feint on the south of Helena; attract the attention of the enemy in that direction, hold the force in the rifle-pits south of the town, and operate otherwise as I could.

Before reaching Beech Grove I withdrew the cavalry advance, and, deploying skirmishers, met the enemy's infantry and cavalry pickets at daybreak. A sharp skirmish ensued, in which three of the enemy were killed and six captured. The company of cavalry in position on the right of the line of skirmishers received a fire which killed three horses. Moving forward to the negro quarters, I found them abandoned, the occupants having fled to the town at the first alarm. Eight negroes were taken and sent to the rear. Shortly afterwards I reached the hill at the Clements house, and, placing my command in position, advanced skirmishers well to the front and right, extending nearly to the river. The enemy soon opened with a rifled battery from the left of the rifle-pits next to the levee, but without doing any injury. Immediately the gunboat commenced firing, one shell exploding in Captain Denson's company, wounding three men and killing three horses. Captain Blocker reported to me with his battery, but a position for it could not be obtained. I moved Etter's section to the hill, and upon gaining the summit it was found impracticable to use but one piece. This opened briskly, drawing a terrific fire from the battery and gunboat, and after expending thirteen rounds Lieutenant Arnett was compelled to withdraw. About eleven o'clock, I ordered Lieutenant E. T. Delony upon the hill with the gun. The range of the enemy's guns was so accurate, and the fire so furious, that he retired after firing eight rounds. The force in front and on the right was fully three times as large as mine. An advance to attack the enemy in the rifle-pits would have subjected my small command to the heavy guns of Fort Curtis, a light battery in rear of the works, an enfilading fire from the rifled battery, and an attack in flank and rear from the levee. Under these circumstances, I deemed it best to hold that force of the enemy in check, and prevent him from

reinforcing his most important points of defence, and by the use of a six-pounder (not being able to bring more than one piece into position) divert as much as possible the fire of the battery and gunboat from the attacking columns. In this I was entirely successful.

At twelve o'clock, M., I received orders from Brigadier General Fagan to retire, and subsequently instructions from Lieutenant General Holmes to halt at a designated position, as the rear guard of the army. By my direction Captain Denson's company applied the torch to the negro quarters, which were consumed, together with five thousand pounds of bacon, fifteen hundred bushels of corn, and a quantity of commissary stores and clothing.

During the entire morning the demonstrations of the enemy behind the levee were of a threatening character. Captain Denson, commanding cavalry detachment, rendered efficient service in counteracting his movements and protecting my right flank. — — —, of his company, distinguished himself in the capture of three prisoners.

I brought off nine prisoners, eight negroes, five mules, one horse and equipments, one ambulance and team, and a small lot of clothing and canteens.

Companies B and K, (skirmishers.) commanded respectively by Captains F. R. Earle and Arkansas Wilson, deserve especial mention for the steadiness with which they advanced, drove the enemy before them, and maintained their positions under a heavy artillery fire.

Lieutenant Colonel Gunter and Major Pettigrew were constantly at their posts in the discharge of their duties.

The only casualty in my regiment was private A. C. Peck, company B, severely wounded in the chest.

I am, Captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. H. BROOKS,
Colonel commanding.

REPORT OF COLONEL BELL'S REGIMENT.

CAMP BAYOU DEVIEW, July 10, 1863.

To Captain THOMAS:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make my report of the part taken by Bell's regiment in the engagement of the 4th instant at Helena. We moved for half a mile at double quick, passing through brush and logs, with which the road was blockaded, and approached in view of Helena at half-past four o'clock, A. M., taking our position on Colonel Hawthorne's left in line of battle, and commenced firing on the enemy in front. The enemy threatened to flank us on the left, when Captains Hurley's and Donaldson's companies were detached and thrown out to engage him, under my command, to protect our left flank. The regiment then advanced over the first hill. Here Captains Pleasants and Smith were wounded, and many men killed and wounded. The ground at this point was almost impassable, and the whole road and deep ravine full of timber, over which I scattered my men, and it was impossible to keep in line; but we succeeded in getting through, after remaining in the timber and hollows nearly two hours under a heavy fire, and made a charge, when, the enemy giving way, we entered the rifle-pits. Here many of our men fell, perfectly exhausted, from over-heat.

At this point the firing ceased on our left, indicating that our forces had been called off. The enemy, seeing our condition, rushed upon and surrounded us, and compelled many of our officers and men to surrender.

The detachment under my command advanced over two ravines and up the hill fronting and nearest to the entrenchments and fort, about three hundred paces distant, which position we held about two hours, keeping up a constant fire until the ammunition was exhausted.

About that time Colonel Hawthorne, on our right, ordered a charge on the entrenchments. I called on my men to join in the charge, which, with the exception of Captain Donaldson and part of his company, followed, and in about twenty minutes we reached the entrenchments, where I remained, awaiting ammunition, which I had sent for, until I was ordered to fall back.

My men, with few exceptions, acted well. I will mention the names of Lieutenant Porter of company B, Lieutenant Thompson, Sergeant Lowry and private Dance, of company A, as acting with marked bravery. The loss of the detachment was two killed, six wounded, and thirty missing. The regiment entered the fight with an aggregate of four hundred and thirty-two; the entire loss was two hundred and seventeen.

I respectfully submit the above as my report of the part taken by Bell's regiment in the engagement of the 4th instant at Helena.

T. H. BLACKNALL,
Major commanding Bell's regiment.

REPORT OF COLONEL HAWTHORNE.

HEADQUARTERS HAWTHORNE'S REGIMENT,
Camp near Bayou De Vie, July 9th, 1863. }

Captain W. C. THOMAS, A. A. General:

SIR: In obedience to orders from brigade headquarters, I have the honor to submit the following report of the part my regiment took in the action at Helena, on the 4th instant:

At eleven o'clock, P. M., on the night of the 3d, we left our encampment, six miles from Helena, and marched to take up our positions in front of the entrenchments, my regiment being in the advance. The road over which we passed (known as the Hill road, from Little Rock to Helena,) was extremely rugged, and it was not without considerable difficulty, and great fatigue to the men, that we succeeded in getting within one mile of the enemy's entrenchments. At this point I found the road blockaded with fallen timber to such an extent, that I halted the brigade, of which I was temporarily in command, sent Captain Millar's company, which had been in advance, to the rear, and sent forward Captain P. G. Roper's company, (A,) deployed as skirmishers. General Fagan now arrived at the head of the column, and ordering all the field and staff officers to dismount, we moved forward as rapidly as possible towards the entrenchments—the skirmishers deployed on either side of the road, keeping well in advance of the main body. At five minutes past four o'clock, A. M., my skirmishers reported the enemy in sight. By order of General Fagan I moved my regiment in double-quick by the right flank, along the crest of a hill running at right angles with the road, and parallel with the enemy's first line of entrenchments; and without halting, so soon as my left had passed the road, I moved by the left flank in line of battle towards the enemy. Without waiting for the other regiments of the brigade to form, I gave the order to charge, which was responded to by loud shouts along my entire line. The men dashed down the steep declivity amid a perfect storm of bullets, climbed step by step over vast piles of fallen timber, up the rugged sides of almost perpendicular hills, and finally, after unheard of toil and fatigue, scaled the opposing height and drove the enemy in consternation from their first line of defences. Here I waited to recruit my men, whose strength was very much exhausted, and to give Colonel Bell time to form his regiment and move up on my left. As soon as Colonel Bell informed me that he was ready, our two regiments moved forward together, and after encountering and overcoming obstacles similar to and even greater than those in front of the first line of rifle-pits, drove the enemy out and took possession of their second line. Colonel King had, by order of General Fagan, under a heavy and constant fire, and after almost superhuman exertions, placed his regiment two or three hundred yards beyond my extreme right, partly in rear of the enemy's third line of entrenchments, and nearly at right

angles with the position occupied by Colonel Bell's regiment and mine. I sent a courier to communicate with him, who returned with the gratifying intelligence that his regiment was in position, and was ready and anxious to charge the enemy. The three regiments now moved forward with a shout, and notwithstanding the steep hill-sides, covered with immense masses of fallen timber, up and over which we had to climb, and notwithstanding the perfect hail storm of bullets which assailed us at every step, we soon drove the enemy out of his third line of defence. We soon rallied our exhausted troops, reformed our broken lines, and again charged the enemy, driving him from his fourth line of entrenchments. It was now about seven o'clock, A. M. My regiment had been hotly engaged for nearly three hours. The men were completely exhausted. Numbers had fainted from excessive heat and fatigue. Many had been killed and wounded, and a large majority in each of our three regiments were utterly unable to fight any longer. We began to be discouraged. From the very commencement of the action we had been listening for the guns of Generals Price, Marmakuke, and Walker, but thus far we had listened in vain. Every brigade except ours had failed to attack at daylight, as ordered. Even the very guns on Grave-yard hill were wheeled around, and directed against our lines, which they swept again and again from one end to the other with grape and canister.

Just at this moment the scene changed. Heavy and rapid volleys of musketry were heard on our left. General Fagan announced to us that our friends were storming Grave-yard hill, and ordered us to move forward at once. Our men responded with a shout, dashed down into the deep ravine, climbed the steep sides of the opposite hill, and just as the noble brigades of Parsons and McRae swept in triumph across the face of Grave-yard hill, drove the enemy from his fifth and last line of rifle-pits back to his forts, and under cover of his siege guns. An attempt was now made by General Fagan to capture the fort on Hindman's hill, which was immediately in our front. But our men were too much exhausted and our numbers too few. The attack was unsuccessful, and resulted in the death and capture of many valuable officers and men. It was here that Captain Walton Watkins, commanding company D, of my regiment, was killed, while gallantly leading this last and most desperate charge. His conduct throughout the engagement had been chivalrous and manly, so much so as to attract universal attention and admiration. Here, also, I lost the services of Major John B Cocke, who was severely wounded and compelled to retire from the field. It affords me much pleasure to bear testimony to the coolness, courage, and efficiency of this gallant officer. His services throughout that desperate fight were invaluable, and his absence was most keenly and sensibly felt. Lieutenants Richard Shaddock, Hinson, Hainard, and Thompson were killed while bravely fighting at their posts.

But to return to the fight: Grave-yard hill was evacuated soon after it was taken. The other positions to the left of that hill, that were to have been taken at daylight, had not even been attacked. The firing had ceased at all points except the firing of our brigade, and

that of our enemies directed against us. This latter was now most terrific, and the whole force of the enemy seemed to be directed against our little band. Yet, notwithstanding their vast superiority in numbers and position ; notwithstanding the terrible, withering fire that continued to pour upon us from their own ranks ; notwithstanding the repeated attempts of the enemy to flank our position, both on the right and on the left, we held our position firmly for three long hours.

At thirty minutes past ten o'clock, A. M., I received an order from General Fagan to withdraw my regiment from the field. I had marched some forty or fifty paces, in compliance with this order, when I received another requiring me to leave a small guard to cover my retreat. I called for volunteers, but no one responding, I returned myself, and with nine men who volunteered to accompany me, kept up a fire upon the enemy for twenty minutes longer. The ammunition was now expended and I thought it prudent to retire. The enemy were close upon us and advancing from all points. Not a moment was to be lost. We retreated as rapidly as possible, but as we descended the first hill, the enemy assailed us with a terrible volley of musketry. Three of our little party fell to rise no more. The remaining six, myself, and a Yankee prisoner, whom we had kept with us all the time, succeeded in making our escape.

My officers and men, with but few exceptions, deported themselves with great gallantry.

My loss, so far as I have been able to ascertain, is as follows : Killed, twenty ; wounded, seventy ; missing, forty-three.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. T. HAWTHORNE,

Colonel commanding regiment.

REPORT OF GENERAL MARMADUKE.

HEADQUARTERS MARMADUKE'S DIVISION, }
Jacksonport, Arkansas, July 25, 1863. }

To Major W. B. BLAIR, A. A. A. General,
District of Arkansas:

MAJOR: I have the honor to report herewith the part taken by my command in the battle at Helena.

I was ordered on the evening of the 3rd of July, to be in position, attack and take the fort on Reiter's hill, at daylight on the morning of the 4th July.

My command, mounted, consisted of Shelby's brigade, about one thousand one hundred men, and Greene's brigade, six hundred and fifty men, total one thousand seven hundred and fifty men.

At ten o'clock, P. M., July 3rd, I marched to get into position; when three miles from the fort I dismounted my whole force except one company under Major Elliott. I then moved forward. When within two miles of the fort, I found the road and country thoroughly obstructed, the enemy having chopped down the trees and rendered almost impassable that approach to the fort and town. The country was exceedingly rough.

I was delayed some half hour or more by my guides, who lost their way, and reported that they were completely lost and unable to guide me further; in consequence of which I did not get into position until a little after daylight, but before sunrise.

The enemy's pickets and skirmishers were encountered some three quarters of a mile from the fort, and driven to within one hundred and fifty yards of the fort. In this the enemy lost several killed, wounded, and five prisoners.

Shelby's brigade was in the advance, and so narrow was the road, and so rough and rugged were the hills, that the troops could only march by the flank, and the artillery with great difficulty was brought up piece by piece and by hand.

By the time the advance had reached within two hundred yards of the fort, and those in rear brought up and deployed along the ridges, the enemy had brought to my left and rear a body of infantry and several pieces of artillery, which during the whole day's fight, poured upon me a deadly fire.

I now had a heavy force in my front, (infantry in rifle-pits and artillery in position,) which it would have been difficult with my whole force to have carried. In addition, I had the forces on my left (of infantry and artillery) thoroughly protected by the levee, which engaged a large part of my force, and on every attempt to advance enfiladed my line. It was from the sharpshooters and artillery on my left and rear that I suffered my greatest loss, and not until they were dislodged could I have advanced. I twice dispatched to Brigadier

General Walker to advance and assist me in dislodging them. It was not done.

From half past four, A. M., till eleven, A. M., I held my position, unable to advance; the enemy with their infantry and artillery on my front and left flank constantly engaging my forces. At eleven, A. M., I received orders from General Holmes to retire.

My loss was fourteen killed, fifty-two wounded, one missing. Among the killed were Major R. H. Smith, my division quartermaster, and Captain J. C. Clark, of company D, Shelby's regiment. Major Smith was a gallant and valuable officer; he was shot dead beside a piece of artillery, encouraging and assisting the canonniers in their duties. Captain Clark was a most exemplary man and excellent officer; he was killed leading his men forward.

Amongst the wounded, I regret to announce that Colonel Shelby, commanding brigade, who was ever in the thickest of the fight, received a painful and serious wound in the wrist.

For a more special report of the conduct of the several regiments and their officers, I respectfully refer you to the brigade commander.

As yet I have not received the report for Shelby's brigade—will forward it as soon as received—have delayed this report awaiting same. The conduct of every officer and soldier of my command, as far as I know, was excellent.

The attack upon Fort Reiter, by my command, was a failure. I have every reason to believe that my troops would have carried it, had it not been for the force on my left and rear, which occupied that position after daylight, and which could and should have been prevented from taking that position, and after they had gained the position, could have been driven from it by General Walker's brigade, which did not come to the support of my left till after seven o'clock, A. M., and during the whole engagement his force was more than half a mile to my left and rear. I could see the force which engaged Walker's brigade, and at no time did it exceed five hundred; I think three hundred a big estimate. Walker's brigade not only did not prevent reinforcements from going to Fort Reiter, but the enemy, after sunrise, actually passed to my left, and half a mile to my rear, and held that position during the day.

Very respectfully,

J. MARMADUKE,
Brigadier General commanding.

REPORT OF GENERAL WALKER.

HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,
Camp near Lick Creek, July 7, 1863. }

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the conduct of my cavalry brigade, in the battle before Helena, on the 4th instant.

In obedience to general orders No. 2, I moved my command towards Helena, on Sterling's road. Arriving at the blockade before daylight I dismounted and sent forward three companies, attempting to capture the enemy's pickets in that direction. At daylight, I sent forward three more companies dismounted, and commenced the work for removing obstacles in the blockade, for the passage of artillery. My advance soon became engaged with the enemy. Reinforcing my advance, and forwarding and bringing into action my artillery, I was continually engaged until nearly three o'clock, P. M. I effectually complied with the part assigned me in the order of attack, by preventing the enemy from throwing troops to Reiter's hill, which they were constantly trying to do, and made two strong efforts and were repulsed. I protected General Marmaduke's left flank. My command was engaged in front of his left. At about two o'clock, I was informed by General Marmaduke, that he had already withdrawn his command. I had hard fighting to protect my left flank, and when my right became exposed I commenced getting loose from the enemy, and retired.

I must speak in the highest terms of the officers and men of my command upon the occasion—no straggling in reaching the place assigned them, although accompanied by apparent insurmountable difficulties, resisted successfully the enemy, and twice drove him away handsomely. I send herewith reports of Colonels Dobbins and Newton.

I am Major, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

L. M. WALKER,
Brigadier General.

REPORT OF COLONEL DOBBINS.

IN THE FIELD, *July 5th, 1863.*

Brigadier General WALKER:

GENERAL: I respectfully submit the following report of the movements of my regiment on the 4th ultimo:

According to your order, I moved my regiment and battery of four pieces, on the evening of the 3d, from the Bowie farm, on the Little Rock road, four miles west of Helena, to the old Porter farm, ~~east~~ of Crawley's ridge, on the road leading from Helena to Sterling, a distance of about fifteen miles, and remained at that place until two o'clock on the morning of the 4th, then moved down the road to a point where the mill road intersects the Sterling road, one and a half miles ~~north~~ of Helena, where I dismounted one hundred and fifty men, and sent them forward as skirmishers, beyond the blockade, to within three-quarters of a mile of Helena, and a short distance above the levee leading out from the hills. I then dismounted one hundred and fifty more men, and sent them forward to the same point, and extended the line of skirmishers from the hills to the Mississippi river. I then drew up the remainder of the regiment in line of battle north of the blockade, about four hundred yards in the rear of the line of skirmishers, and there awaited to learn the result of the attack made by General Marmaduke upon the battery and fortifications on Reiter hill, and, not learning anything definite, and discovering the enemy moving up between the levee and Mississippi river, I moved my battery forward according to your order, and commenced firing on the enemy advancing, and also the enemy's batteries playing upon General Marmaduke's command and my front. I then advanced, causing the enemy to fall back, moving their battery some six hundred yards further down the levee. About two hours after the enemy again advanced with artillery, and in much larger force than at first. I again opened fire on them with my battery and small arms, and, with the assistance of a portion of Colonel Newton's regiment, again caused them to fall back, and move their battery still further down the levee; after which skirmishing was kept up until some three hours after the firing had ceased along our entire line, at which time I received your order to fall back slowly on the Grant mill road, which I succeeded in doing without losing any men after I left the battle-field.

The loss in my regiment in the engagement was four killed and eight wounded—one mortally, two seriously, and five slightly. For particulars I refer you to Dr. Dunn, surgeon of my regiment, herewith enclosed.

The officers and men of my regiment and battery deserve great credit for gallantry and courage displayed on that day.

Very respectfully your obedient servant,

ARCH. S. DOBBINS,
Colonel commanding regiment cavalry.

REPORT OF COLONEL NEWTON.

HEADQUARTERS NEWTON'S REGIMENT ARKANSAS CAVALRY,
Camp at Gist's, Phillips county, Arkansas, July 8, 1863.

Captain J. C. ALEXANDER,

A. A. G. Walker's Division, &c., in the field:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor, in obedience to your instructions of to-day, to submit the following report of the part taken by my regiment in the attack on Helena on the 4th instant:

I reached Mrs. Moonley's and halted there about twelve o'clock, P. M., on 3rd instant. About an hour before day on the morning of the 4th, in obedience to an order from the Brigadier General commanding, I resumed the march, taking the Sterling road towards Helena, moving in rear of Colonel Dobbins' regiment. Arriving at the spring, about a mile from town, the brigade was halted by General Walker. We remained there until the firing commenced to our right, when I was ordered up to a point near the blockade of felled timber, there to await orders.

About seven o'clock I received an order to send thirty sharpshooters to the support of Colonel Dobbins' regiment, who were deployed to our front, beyond the blockade and to the left of the skirmishers, from General Marmaduke's command. I detailed the required number from the different companies, selecting men with long range guns, as far as practicable, placed them under command of Lieutenant Barnes, of company A, and carried them forward to the left of Dobbins' skirmishers and beyond the lagoon, (which, starting from near the base of the levee, on the north side of Helena, runs eastward to Porter's lake,) where they were soon engaged with the enemy, and did good service.

At half-past seven, by order of General Walker, I detached companies B and G, under command of Captain Portis, of the former, and deployed them as skirmishers to support Barnes' sharpshooters, and resist a small force of Federal cavalry which was reported to be threatening our extreme left. About eight o'clock Portis reported to me that the enemy had reinforced in his front, that he was being pressed, and needed two more companies. I immediately communicated the information to General Walker, and, by his direction, instructed Portis to observe the enemy closely, skirmish with him, and, if too heavily pressed, fall back slowly, advising me from time to time of what was transpiring.

About this time I received an order to send forward another company to support Dobbins' skirmishers, which I obeyed by sending Captain Rolland's company E, under command of Lieutenant Garner.

Learning that the enemy had made several attempts to force Portis back and gain possession of the west bank of Porter's lake, which would enable him, by means of his sharpshooters, to annoy the rear at our battery posted on the hill in front of the blockade, and, perhaps,

finally force us from the hill altogether, I went in person to where Portis was to learn the true condition of affairs and ascertain what, if anything, could be done. I found that Portis, with his small force, had made a gallant resistance, and had thus far foiled the enemy in his several attempts to occupy the western or inner bank of Porter's lake; but that he, nevertheless, had lost some ground, and had but little more to lose. I deemed it important, therefore, not only to regain what had been lost, but to drive the enemy beyond the levee and into town, if possible, with my small force. There not being time left me to previously communicate with General Walker, I ordered up companies C and F without first notifying him. The latter I deployed as skirmishers and advanced to the front. They were soon engaged. I moved company C forward across the lagoon before mentioned, and, pursuing the skirmishers to the front vigorously, ordered a charge. The enemy fled precipitately. We pursued him about three hundred yards. Finding that he was rallying his men in his rifle-pits, which were situated to the left of the levee and near the river bank, I deployed my whole force then with me as skirmishers, posted them as best I could, and left them under command of Captain Portis, with instructions to hold the ground we had thus gained, until he should receive other orders from me. I started to the headquarters of the Brigadier General commanding to get permission to use my whole regiment for the purpose of dislodging the enemy, or, failing in that, confining him to his rifle-pits, and thus prevent him from annoying our left. Arriving there, I learned that our troops were withdrawing, and, by General Walker's direction, retired my command to the point where the mountain road, leading from the spring on the Sterling road to the Grant's mill road, diverges from the Sterling road, and there disposed my forces so as to cover the withdrawal of our troops. When the rear of Dobbins' regiment had passed, I moved back on the mountain road, as directed, and thence upon Grant's mill road.

I enclose herewith a list of casualties. The officers and men engaged behaved in admirable style. Captains Portis and Bryant, commanding skirmishers, did their duty well. Lieut. Barnes, who, with his thirty sharpshooters, was almost constantly engaged, here, as everywhere else that I have ever placed him, was prompt and faithful, and displayed great courage. Lieutenant Smith, adjutant of the regiment, brave to a fault, and seeking rather than avoiding danger, rendered much valuable service. And as were the officers, so were the private soldiers whom they led, fearless of danger, each seeming intent solely on doing his duty well.

I am, Captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. C. NEWTON, *Colonel commanding.*



BATTLE OF BRISTOE STATION.

REPORT OF GENERAL A. P HILL.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY CORPS, }
October 26, 1863. }

Colonel R. H. CHILTON,

A. A. and I. General, Army Northern Virginia:

COLONEL: I have the honor to state that on the morning of the 14th instant, I left my camp, one mile distant from Warrenton, on the Amissville turnpike, at five o'clock, A. M., and, in obedience to orders from the General commanding, "took the Warrenton and Alexandria turnpike, until reaching Broad run church, then to take the road by Greenwich and on to Bristoe station." Upon arriving at Broad run church, information reached me from various sources, that the enemy were moving by a road leading from Greenwich to the Warrenton and Alexandria pike, and coming into it a mile below Buckland. The rumbling of wagons, which could be distinctly heard, led me to place reliance in these reports.

General Anderson was directed to take his division down the turnpike towards Buckland, and, if possible, to strike the column at the point where it came into the pike. If nothing could be accomplished there, to turn off and rejoin me at Greenwich. In the meantime, I moved on the road to Greenwich with Illeth's and Wilcox's divisions, leaving one battery and Scales' brigade at Buckland, to guard the train which had been directed to halt there. General Anderson, in the execution of my orders, found the force referred to to be of cavalry, having already disappeared, and that Major General Fitzhugh Lee had come up with his cavalry, on my left flank; Col. Rosser, of his advance, having skirmished with the enemy, and driven them back, rejoined me at Greenwich, following Heth's division. From this point to Bristoe, we followed close upon the rear of the third corps, picking up about one hundred and fifty stragglers. Upon reaching the hills this side of Broad run, and overlooking the plain on the north side, the third corps was discovered resting, a portion of it just commencing the march towards Manassas. I determined that no

time must be lost, and hurried up Heth's division, forming it in line of battle along the crest of the hills, and parallel to Broad run. Poague's battalion was brought to the front and directed to open on the enemy. They were evidently taken completely by surprise, and retired in the utmost confusion. Seeing this, General Heth was directed to advance his line until reaching the rear, and then to move by the left flank, cross at the ford, and press the enemy. This order was being promptly obeyed, when I perceived the enemy's skirmishers making their appearance on this side of Broad run, and on the right and rear of Heth's division. Word was sent to General Cooke (commanding the right brigade of Heth's division,) to look out for his right flank, and he very promptly changed the front of one of his regiments, and drove the enemy back. In the meantime, I sent back to General Anderson to send McIntosh's battalion to the front, and to take two brigades to the position threatened, and protect the right flank of Heth. The head of Anderson's column appearing, Heth was now ordered to advance again, and carry out the original order. Davis' brigade, of Heth's division, had been detached as a support to Poague's battalion. The three brigades, Cooke's, Kirkland's and Walker's, advanced in beautiful order, and quite steadily. Cooke's brigade, upon reaching the crest of the hill in their front, came within full view of the enemy's line of battle behind the railroad embankment, the second corps, and of whose presence I was unaware. The position was an exceedingly strong one, and covered by the direct and enfilading fire of batteries on the rising ground in rear. A portion of Cooke's brigade became hotly engaged, and of course it became impossible to execute his original order to move by the left flank. Kirkland, finding Cooke engaged, also swung around his left, and gallantly charged to Cooke's assistance. McIntosh's battalion had before this, been ordered by me to take a position overlooking the railroad and station, and in rear of Cooke's left. Poague's battalion was ordered to take another position, and open fire on the battery which was enfilading Kirkland's line. This was not done as quickly as I expected, and Kirkland's line was exposed to a very deliberate and destructive fire. Nevertheless it continued to advance, and gained the railroad, clearing it for a time of the enemy. About this time, Generals Cooke and Kirkland were both wounded, and their fall at this critical moment had a serious influence upon the fortunes of the combat. Their men were unable to stand the heavy fire which was poured upon them, and commenced giving back, the three right regiments of Cooke's brigade in good order. Walker had crossed Broad run in pursuance of the original order. Anderson had been sent to the right to look out for the threatened right flank, and no support was immediately available, Wilcox's division not having yet come up. The infantry falling back, (the left of Cooke's brigade) passed through McIntosh's guns, and the enemy pressing on, the guns, five in number, were immediately seized and ran down the hill, under the protection of the enemy's artillery and line of battle. General Walker, upon being informed of the perilous condition of the guns, immediately sent forward a regiment, and drove off the en-

emy, but the guns had disappeared. Dark came upon us before new dispositions could be made to attack, and during the night the enemy retreated.

Brig. General Posey was seriously wounded by a shell in the early part of the action. In conclusion, I am convinced that I made the attack too hastily, and at the same time that, a delay of half an hour and there would have been no enemy to attack. In that event, I should equally have blamed myself for not attacking at once.

I enclose my official report of killed, wounded and missing.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. P. HILL,
Lieutenant General commanding third corps.

REPORT OF GENERAL HETH.

HEADQUARTERS HETH'S DIVISION, }
October 24, 1863. }

Captain W. N. STARKE,

A. A. G., third army corps :

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division on the 14th instant:

The division moved from camp near Warrenton at half-past five o'clock, A. M., on the 14th instant, following General Anderson's division. When within a mile of New Baltimore, orders were received to pass General Anderson's artillery, by keeping to the right, as it was designed that my division should follow a different road. After passing through New Baltimore, and about a mile and a half or less from the village, I was directed to take a right hand road, which proved to be a cross road leading to Bristoe station, via Greenwich. Just before reaching Greenwich, some twenty stragglers of the third corps, Federal army, were captured. A desultory fire of artillery was heard from just after daybreak, apparently on our right, and continued during the entire day.

It was ascertained at Greenwich that a corps of the enemy had encamped there the night previous, the last of this corps leaving about eight o'clock, A. M., on the 14th. From Greenwich we passed on by the most direct road to Bristoe station, picking up a number of stragglers on the road.

When within a mile and a half of Bristoe station, I was directed by General A. P. Hill to form three brigades of my division in line of battle, perpendicular to the road on which we were advancing, holding the fourth brigade as a reserve, which was to continue its march by the flank. Cooke's brigade (leading) was formed on the right of the road, its left resting on the road; Kirkland was put in position on the left of the road, his right resting on the road, and forming a continuous line with Cooke; Walker was directed to form on Kirkland's left; Davis's brigade was held in reserve in the road.

Kirkland had not quite completed the formation of his line when orders were received from General Hill to push on with the two brigades then in line, (Cooke's and Kirkland's,) informing me, at the same time, that the enemy were retreating rapidly, and that expedition was necessary.

Walker's brigade was at this time in rear of Kirkland, his right resting in rear of Kirkland's right. General Walker was informed of the change, and directed to form on Kirkland's left, if possible, as Kirkland moved forward.

The order was now given to advance. On reaching a cleared space, some two or three hundred yards in our front, the enemy was discovered about three-quarters of a mile in front of Kirkland's left. A few shots from one of Poague's batteries threw them into much confusion, and all that were in sight retreated in disorder across Broad

run. On seeing this, General Hill directed me to move by the left flank, cross Broad run, and attack the fugitives. This order was given, and my line halted for the left to commence the flank movement. Before this movement was commenced, information was received that a heavy column of the enemy had appeared on our right. I asked General Hill whether the flank movement should continue. He directed that it should be deferred for the present. Some ten minutes afterwards I received orders to move forward. About this time General Cooke in person reported to me that the enemy would take him in flank as he moved forward. This was reported to General Hill; who informed me that General Anderson's division had been or would be ordered to the right. General Cooke was informed of this, and the forward movement commenced. Walker had not been able to form line of battle on Kirkland's left. The two brigades (Cooke's and Kirkland's) moved off in handsome style. The skirmishers soon became engaged. The enemy's strength in my front was only known from the reports made by Captain Johnston, engineer corps. As subsequently shewn, it proved to be Warren's second army corps. Marching parallel to the railroad, the enemy was concealed from our view by hills and woods. On seeing our advance, the enemy formed his line in rear of the railroad embankment, his right resting on Broad run, and hidden by a railroad cut. In his rear a line of hills ascended to some thirty or forty feet in height, giving him an admirable position for his artillery. The railroad cut and embankment, at the foot of the hill, gave him perfect protection for his infantry. In rear of the enemy's right, on the hills just noticed, a circular line of rifle-pits had been thrown up for the protection of the bridge over Broad run. These rifle-pits were filled with infantry, and a battery was established in rear and higher up the hills.

As Kirkland moved forward, his left struck the enemy in the railroad cut, near Broad run. He drove everything in his front along the line of the railroad before him, but was unable to carry the second line of works (rifle-pits) that were in his front. When in the railroad cut, his men were exposed to an enfilading fire from his right, in addition to a severe fire from a battery on the north side of Broad run. The position was untenable. He was compelled to fall back. A number of his men, unwilling to expose themselves, remained in the railroad cut, and were captured. General Cooke was wounded early in the action. When within some five hundred yards of the railroad his brigade halted, and commenced firing. It subsequently charged up to within forty yards of the railroad embankment, but was driven back, being exposed not only to the heavy fire behind the railroad embankment, but also to a fire on its right flank.

The enemy's batteries, during the advance of Cooke and Kirkland, completely swept the field over which the advance was made.

As soon as Cooke's brigade gave way, I ordered General Davis to form his brigade on Cooke's right, thus protecting Cooke from a flank movement.

During the advance of Cooke and Kirkland, a battery belonging to McIntosh's battalion, Anderson's division, was ordered to take posi-

tion on a hill about five or six hundred yards from the railroad, and about opposite Kirkland's right flank and Cooke's left. This battery was captured by the enemy. I was ignorant of the fact that a battery had been ordered to occupy this position, until it had been taken. A knowledge of its position on my part, however, would not have saved it, as it would not have been deemed necessary to have furnished a special support for it so long as the two brigades (Cooke's and Kirkland's) were in its front. On receiving information that the enemy's skirmishers were approaching the battery, and that it was in danger, a regiment was ordered to its support, but arrived on the ground after five guns had been taken off.

During the advance of Kirkland, Walker gained ground to the left, crossing Broad run. Finding that Kirkland's left was gaining ground to the right, General Walker re-crossed the run. Before he could form on Kirkland's left, Kirkland had been driven back.

General Walker, during the rest of the engagement, supported a battery from Poague's battalion, placed on a hill about seven or eight hundred yards from the railroad. This engagement was over before either Walker or Davis could be brought into action.

After the repulse of Cooke and Kirkland, I reformed my line and advanced again to within about five hundred yards of the railroad, where I remained during the night. No second attack was ordered, as I was convinced that the position of the enemy was too strong to be attacked in front. The position now occupied enabled me to avail myself of an opportunity to resume the attack in the event of an attack being made on the enemy's left flank by General Ewell's troops, or others.

I deem it but just to the troops commanded by Generals Cooke and Kirkland to say, that, with the exception of one regiment, all behaved well under the circumstances.

It must be borne in mind that when the attack was made by Cooke and Kirkland, the enemy's force in front was unknown. It turned out that a much larger force was in our front than was supposed—one, if not the greater portion of two, entire corps. The position accidentally occupied by the enemy was as strong, or stronger, naturally and artificially, than military art could have made it by many hours' work. The enemy's left flank extended a mile, or three-quarters, to my right; he was not compelled to manœuvre to get into position, marching by the flank; he was already in line of battle, protected by a railroad embankment, at a convenient height to shelter his men; with hills in his rear admirably adapted to render effective his numerous batteries. No military man, who has examined the ground, or who understands the position and the disproportionate numbers of the contending forces, would attach blame to these two brigades for meeting with a repulse. My confidence in these troops is not shaken by the result, and I feel satisfied on fields to come they will vindicate the high reputation they have gained on many a hard fought battle-field. Had they succeeded in driving the enemy in their front before them, and carried the hills beyond the railroad, it is probable the two brigades would have been captured by the enemy unengaged on their right.

I beg leave to bring to the notice of the Lieutenant General commanding the gallantry displayed by Generals Cooke and Kirkland, both of whom were severely wounded. I regret that, in the absence of the reports of brigade and regimental commanders, I am unable to name the officers who deserve special mention for good conduct. A report of casualties is enclosed. My thanks are due to my personal staff.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

4

H. HETH, *Major General.*

REPORT OF GENERAL R. H. ANDERSON.

HEADQUARTERS ANDERSON'S DIVISION,
Near Rappahannock Station, Va., }
October 21, 1863. }

Captain W. N. STARKE,

A. A. General Third Army Corps :

CAPTAIN: At half-past two o'clock in the afternoon of the 14th instant, when near Bristoe Station, I received orders from the Lieutenant General commanding the third corps, to send McIntosh's battalion of artillery to the front, and to move two brigades of my division to the right of the road by which we had been approaching the Station, to intercept a column of the enemy's troops, which was moving along the railroad towards the station.

Posey's and Perry's brigades were immediately put in motion through a piece of woods, to execute the order, but before they arrived within striking distance, the enemy moved off at double-quick, and disappeared in a piece of pine forest, near the railroad.

The brigades continued to advance towards the railroad, in the direction which had been indicated by Lieutenant General Hill, until they found the enemy strongly posted behind the railroad embankments and cuts, with a battery of artillery so planted as to enfilade the road, and sweep the open piece of ground between them and ourselves.

The column which I had been directed to intercept had got into position along the railroad, and I halted the troops until I could examine the ground between them and the enemy. Whilst so engaged, I met Brigadier General Long, who proposed to place some of his artillery upon a slight eminence which afforded a good position for artillery. To this I gladly assented, as I deemed it necessary to the further advance of the troops of my command.

At this time, I received notice that the troops of the second corps were coming up on my right, and I was directed to form a line of battle, so as to connect my right with the left of that corps. The other brigades of my division were then ordered up, and the line was formed as quickly as the nature of the ground would permit. During these movements of my command, Heth's division became hotly engaged, and a brigade of his troops, near the left of my division, was driven back. The enemy's skirmishers advanced through the gap, and General Long found it impracticable to post his artillery. Perry's brigade checked the farther advance of the enemy, and Mahone's was put in motion to regain the ground from which our men had been driven, but before it reached the place, it was reoccupied by another brigade of Heth's division. Perry's and Posey's brigade then drove back the enemy's line of skirmishers, and General Long's artillery got into position, but it was now nearly dark, and, after a few minutes' cannonading, to which the enemy replied warmly, the firing was discontinued.

The troops of my division remained in line of battle during the night. In the morning, the enemy were gone.

I regret to report that in this affair, Captain Thomas L. Barrand, of the sixteenth Virginia regiment, an excellent officer, was killed. Brigadier General Posey and Lieutenant Colonel Baya, commanding eighth Florida regiment, received severo wounds, the former in the left thigh, and the latter in the right hip, and Captain A. R. Jones, twelfth Mississippi regiment, was wounded in the right leg. The total casualties were eleven (11) killed, and forty-three (43) wounded.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

R. H. ANDERSON,
Major General commanding.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL H. H. WALKER.

HEADQUARTERS WALKER'S BRIGADE, {
October 21, 1863. }

Major R. H. FINNEY,

A. A. General, Heth's Division :

MAJOR: In accordance with circular from division headquarters, I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by my brigade in the engagement at Bristoe Station, on the 14th of October, 1863:

My brigade was formed in line of battle in a woods, about one hundred yards in rear of General Kirkland's, my right covering his right, his brigade being nearly double the length of mine. While in this position, General Heth informed me the enemy was running, that he would not have time for me to get upon Kirkland's left, but that I must do so on the march. This I found impossible to do. Kirkland's brigade soon got into the open field, and commenced gaining ground to the right, by a wheel, while mine, already behind and on the circumference, had a dense woods to march through for half a mile. This distance brought my brigade on Broad run. While crossing this in line of battle, Kirkland became hotly engaged. Seeing his left gaining ground so fast to the front and right, I marched my brigade by the right flank, again crossed Broad run, and double-quicked my brigade, to try and catch up with Kirkland's left. When I got into the open field, I saw his left had been repulsed, and was falling back in utter confusion. I succeeded in getting the three right regiments of my brigade interposed between the enemy's advance and the battery on the hill at the cemetery. A portion of Kirkland's brigade (two regiments,) were then rallied on the right of these regiments. The four regiments on the left of my brigade were halted on the crest of the hill at the cemetery, abreast with the battery at that place. The line remained thus until the regiments of Kirkland's brigade were moved, under direction of General Kirkland's Adjutant General, to the right and rear of the battery at the cemetery. Captain Hill, of General Hill's staff, then brought an order for this battery to move to the right. I told him I was supporting the battery, and asked him if I should move with it? He replied "Yes." I had scarcely gotten half way down the hill with my brigade, when Major McIntosh reported to me that his supports having retired, he had to withdraw his men from the battery on the right of the road, and that if I could get a regiment there in time, I might retake it. This I endeavored to do immediately, and ordered a regiment to double-quicke to the position, but before it arrived, the guns were out of sight. Simultaneously with Major McIntosh, Major Finney, Adjutant General, reported that the enemy were again advancing in the direction of the cemetery. I immediately deployed a regiment as skirmishers;

again formed my brigade in its original position, and remained so until new dispositions were made for the night.

I omitted to state at the commencement, before my brigade was put into line, General Hill detached the fourteenth Tennessee regiment, and directed it to take a position as skirmishers on the right of his line. This regiment rejoined the brigade the next morning. Enclosed is a list of casualties during the engagement.

Respectfully submitted,

H. H. WALKER,
Brigadier General.

REPORT OF COLONEL HALL.

HEADQUARTERS COOKE'S BRIGADE, }
Near Rappahannock Station, Va., October 22, 1863. }

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that, on the 14th instant, on arriving within one or two miles of Bristoe Station, the brigade formed a line of battle on the right of the road in the following order: first, forty-sixth North Carolina; second, fifteenth North Carolina; third, twenty-seventh North Carolina, and the forty-eighth North Carolina on the left. After forming, we advanced through a very thick undergrowth. On clearing the woods and arriving in the first opening, the brigade was halted a few moments to correct the alignment. The enemy was discovered massed upon our left beyond the railroad, and to the left of the road leading to the station. Being then in command of the extreme right regiment, I immediately discovered that the enemy was in heavy force on my right, and busily engaged in getting in position. In a few moments we were ordered to advance, and soon after the enemy's skirmishers commenced firing on my right flank. I discovered the line of battle behind the railroad extending as far on my right as I could see. Also, a mass of troops lying perpendicular to the road, and on the side next to us, from which body an advance was made on my right in considerable numbers. I then sent word to General Cooke that I was much annoyed by the fire and seriously threatened. I sent my right company to engage the skirmishers on my right, but they were soon driven in. I then changed the front of my regiment on the first company and checked their advance. The brigade had again halted, just before getting under fire, and I moved back just in time to join the line in its final advance. Soon after getting under fire, I found that the left of the brigade had commenced firing as they advanced, which was taken up along the whole line. Shortly afterwards information was brought me that General Cooke was wounded, and that I was in command. I ordered my regiment to cease firing, and passed up to the centre of the brigade, stopping the firing as I went. The brigade was then within two hundred yards of the railroad. On getting on the top of the hill, I found the brigade suffering from a heavy flank fire of artillery from the right—the number of guns I cannot say, evidently more than one battery. Also, the guns on the left and rear of the railroad had an enfilading fire on us. The musketry fire from the line of railroad was very heavy. I soon saw that a rapid advance must be made, or to withdraw. I chose the former. I passed the word to the right regiments to charge, which was done in what I conceived to be in good style. The fourth regiment was somewhat confused. But I sent the Lieutenant Colonel commanding word to follow the line, which he did with about two-thirds of his regiment, the balance giving way. The brigade charged up to within forty yards of the railroad, and from the severity of the fire, and from then

seeing the extreme left of the line falling back, they fell back; the two right regiments in good order; the third (twenty-seventh North Carolina) in an honorable confusion, from the fact that between one-half and two-thirds of the regiment had been killed and wounded, they being in a far more exposed position than the other two regiments, and had gone further. The forty-eighth, in advancing, encountered the whole line falling back. I halted the brigade in the first field we came to, about four hundred yards from the enemy's line, from which position we fell back beyond the second field, on seeing the enemy come out on our right and left. After a short time the brigade of General Davis joined us on the right, when we again advanced to within four hundred yards of the enemy, and, on seeing the right brigade halt, I halted, where we remained during the night. As there was a battery of artillery lost during the engagement, and from its proximity to the brigade the loss may be laid to it, I will state that I knew nothing of the guns being there until we had fallen back to the second field. The guns *may have* been in our rear, but they must certainly have been placed there after we advanced; and, in retreating, from our losses, both by casualties and straggling, shortened our line so much that, with the addition of one of General Kirkland's regiments, (forty-fourth North Carolina,) which joined our left, the left of the brigade was some distance to the right of the guns. On learning the guns were there, and in danger, I dispatched a portion of one regiment to the relief, but the guns had been taken off before the relief arrived. I would respectfully state that I have been with the brigade during some of the heaviest engagements of the war, and have never seen the men more cool and determined, and that their falling back resulted from no fault of theirs, but from the great superiority of numbers and position of the enemy, and entire want of support, both in rear and prolongation of our lines.

I have the honor to be, respectfully,

E. D. HALL, *Colonel commanding.*

REPORT OF MAJOR McINTOSH.

HEADQUARTERS McINTOSH'S BATTALION ARTILLERY, }
In camp, near Beverly Ford, Oct. 23, 1863. }

To Captain W. N. STARKE, *A. A. G., third Army Corps:*

CAPTAIN: In accordance with your request, I have the honor to submit the following report, being duplicate of one already furnished Colonel Walker, of the part taken by this battalion in the engagement at Bristoe Station on the afternoon of the 14th instant.

When within about a mile of the station I received an order from Major General Anderson, through Major Duncan, his staff officer, to move my battalion to the front. Passing the division I halted a moment upon the opened ground where the descent to the railroad begins; and Major Duncan saying, as he joined me again, that he had directions from Lieutenant General Hill where to place me, I moved immediately on, attracting some fire from the enemy's batteries. Observing that I was approaching near the enemy, I ordered Captain Hunt to take his two Whitworth guns out of the column and place them in the best position he could find on the hills in rear. Captain Johnson's battery had previously been detached by order of General Anderson, and left at Broad run. With the remaining nine guns, I proceeded to follow Major Duncan, who pointed out an open space between two pine thickets as the position which I was to occupy. Our line of infantry was then in the act of advancing over the hill at this point, and drew a heavy musketry fire on them in rear. I therefore halted my column at the base of the rising ground in front, sending word by Lieutenant Houston, my ordnance officer, who accompanied me on the field, to Lieutenant General Hill, why I had done so, and ordering the pieces to draw up under cover, I proceeded to look at the ground with Major Duncan. On casting my eye over the field, I saw and represented to Major Duncan, the exposure of the situation, because of its proximity to the railroad bank, being only four or five hundred yards distant, where the enemy's line of battle was posted, and in full view of a number of opposing batteries, stretching from the left to the extreme right. He (Major Duncan) left, saying he would represent the situation to General Hill. In the meantime our line had advanced a short distance over the crest of the hill, and exhibiting symptoms of wavering, I ordered up five light rifle guns, consisting of the second Rockbridge battery, three guns, Lieutenant Wallace commanding, and a section of Hunt's battery, under Lieutenant Crenshaw, and directed them to open with shell, firing over the heads of our men.

Lieutenant Houston returned just at this time, with a message from General Hill, that he wished me to take position as quickly as possible, and I therefore ordered up a section of Rice's Napoleon battery, placing it to the left of the rifle guns. Before this order was executed, however, our line of infantry in front had broken, and falling back to

the guns, passed on to the rear; my officers joined me in endeavoring to rally and stop them upon the slope in rear of the guns, but without avail. Lieutenant Wilson while thus engaged was struck down and seriously injured by a shell.

The ground being clear of our infantry in front, I directed a round or two of cannister to be thrown at the enemy along the railroad, but pointed the fire chiefly against the opposing battery, which concentrated upon me a converging fire from three directions. I dispatched a messenger hastily to General Hill, to say that I was badly enfiladed from the right, and regarded the position untenable, which message the General has since informed me he did not receive.

Believing I could obtain a position to the right, where I could divert the enemy's fire, I proceeded in that direction with the two guns un-disposed of, a section of Napoleon, under Lieutenant Price, and met Major Duncan on the way, who told me guns were needed in that quarter, and who showed me a position from which the enemy's battery, then annoying me so much, could be taken almost in rear. He informed me at the same time that General Long would have up a number of guns in a few minutes, and as one of Lieutenant Price's was detained by an accident on the way, I deemed it imprudent to open with one gun, and ordered the lieutenant to report to General Long as soon as he came up, and desire him to open immediately.

Returning to the first position, where I had left seven guns engaged, I observed that the fire had ceased. On inquiring the reason of Lieutenant Wallace, then in command, he replied that he had not men enough left to work the guns; that the enemy was advancing, and he had just been to look for infantry support. I at once ordered the guns to be dragged down the hill by hand, and the remaining men, who were lying in the bush, started forward, but at that instant, a body of the enemy, apparently skirmishers, appeared stealing over the crest of the hill, and in a moment more were among the guns. I saw it was too late to remove them, and directed the limbers and caissons to be drawn off on the edge of the wood, and the men to retire without noise.

Believing the number of the enemy at the guns to be small, and that they could still be recovered with prompt action, I rode rapidly in search of a body of infantry, but the plain in my rear was bare of all troops. After some minutes, I found a brigade—General Walker's, I think—and reported to him the condition of affairs, and desired him to throw forward a body as quickly as possible.

A few minutes after I observed General Heth approaching, when I informed him also of my situation. Lieutenant Wallace informs me that he saw the enemy roll off the guns by hand, in a few minutes after they were taken possession of. The two Napoleon guns of Captain Rice were both disabled, having their axles broken, and the cheek of one shivered; one was dragged off before the approach of the enemy. The other was recovered the next morning. All the ammunition in the limbers of the pieces was expended by Captain Rice, his caissons being kept in rear. He estimates the time during which he was en-

gaged, at one hour; his casualties were eight men wounded, and ten horses disabled.

The five rifle pieces, which preceeded Captain Rice in the action, were engaged probably an hour and a quarter. Lieutenant Wallace's three guns fired two hundred and four rounds. His casualties were two lieutenants wounded, and two men killed and thirteen wounded; Lieutenant Crenshaw's section fired only twenty-five rounds; his casualties were one man killed and sixteen wounded.

The total of casualties was three men killed and thirty-nine wounded, forty-four horses were disabled. The section of Napoleon guns, under Lieutenant Price, reported to Lieutenant Colonel Jones, of General Long's command, and was engaged late in the afternoon, without suffering any loss in men or horses. The section of Whitworths fired eight shots at the enemy, also without loss.

I am, Captain, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

D. G. McINTOSH,

Major artillery.

EXPEDITION INTO EAST TENNESSEE.

REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL STEVENSON.

HEADQUARTERS STEVENSON'S DIVISION, }
Near Tyner's Station, November 12, 1863. }

To Colonel G. W. BRENT,
A. A. G. Army of Tennessee:

COLONEL: Agreeably to orders received from army headquarters on the 17th ultimo, I proceeded to Charleston, Tennessee, arriving therewith a portion of my command about two o'clock, P. M., on the 19th ultimo.

The failure of the railroad officials to carry out the arrangements and obey the orders relative to the transportation of the troops, and the delay caused thereby, have been made the subject of a special communication to the commanding General.

Immediately upon my arrival at Charleston I gave the following directions to Colonels Morrison and Dibrell, commanding brigades of cavalry:

"Colonel Morrison, with his whole effective force, reinforced by Colonel McKenzie's and Major Jessie's commands, will move so as to reach the rear of Philadelphia by daylight to-morrow morning, and be prepared to co-operate with Colonel Dibrell, who, with his effective command, will advance so as to attack the enemy, supposed to be at that point, at daylight. Should the enemy not be found at Philadelphia, the commands will seek and capture or drive him across the Tennessee. Having routed the cavalry, they will move on London, and, should the force of the enemy's infantry there be small, will attack and carry that place. In that event London will be held by a sufficient force, and suitable scouts be sent up the river for information with regard to the enemy in that direction. Colonel Morrison

will send a select force of one hundred and fifty men, in command of a suitable officer, to destroy the ferry at Kingston. He will also detail from his command two companies to picket the river on our left flank."

The movement directed was at once commenced, but owing to the difficulty in crossing the Hiwassee at the ford by which Colonel Morrison moved, the attack was not made until as late as one o'clock, P. M., on the 20th ultimo. For a time the resistance was stubborn, the enemy making a gallant fight, but finally they broke and fled, in the greatest confusion, to their defences at London. The fact that they had there a fortified position, with an infantry support, the approach of darkness, and the exhaustion of our cavalry after their long march and severe fight, decided Colonels Morrison and Dibrell not to make an immediate attack upon London. Our loss amounted to fifteen killed, eighty-two wounded and three missing. That of the enemy was greater in killed and wounded, and by capture about seven hundred prisoners, six pieces of artillery, and all their wagons, ambulances and camp equipage. On the next morning the enemy advanced in force, infantry and cavalry, from London, and Colonels Morrison and Dibrell withdrew their commands to Sweetwater, there to await the arrival of the infantry. The enemy fell back to London that night. I reached the front on the morning of the 22d, moved the infantry to Mouse creek that day, and soon afterwards to Sweetwater. On the evening of the 23rd of October the enemy advanced in considerable force and engaged the cavalry for a short time, retiring at dusk. Their loss is not known. Ours is five wounded.

The same movement was again made by them on the evening of the 26th of October. In this affair our loss was three wounded and five missing. The enemy are known to have had three commissioned officers and several privates killed, and a number wounded.

On the 27th October I was informed that the notorious bushwhacker and robber, Bryson, had been sent, with his command, by Burnside to get in my rear and obtain information as to our movements and intentions. I immediately gave Brigadier General Vaughn a detachment of about one hundred men, and directed him to intercept and, if possible, destroy the party. He succeeded in dispersing them, killing several, and taking among the prisoners a captain. During the pursuit, Bryson himself was killed.

On the 27th of October Cheatham's division, commanded during the expedition by Brigadier General Jackson, reached Athens, and by this accession my force, before so weak as to be entirely inadequate for a decided movement against the enemy at London, was strengthened to such an extent as would have enabled me to actively assume the offensive; but the enemy, informed doubtless by disloyal citizens of the arrival of these reinforcements, evacuated London on the night of the same day.

On the 28th of October I sent Brigadier General Vaughn, with a force of cavalry, across the Little Tennessee river at Morgantown, with orders to make a demonstration upon Knoxville and gain all the information he could of the enemy's force, movements, and intentions.

He found a force at Leaper's ferry, attacked and drove them across the river after quite a sharp engagement, inflicting considerable loss upon them. He also went to Lenoir's ferry. The sudden and heavy rain that fell at this time raised the Little Tennessee so rapidly that it became exceedingly hazardous for him to remain on that side, and he accordingly returned to Morgantown.

On the 3rd November Colonel Dibrell crossed the Little Tennessee, with about seven hundred men, but found the enemy in too great force in his front to permit him to make any decided move. The results of these scouts in eliciting information were promptly communicated to you by telegraph.

On the 4th of November I received orders by telegraph to send two of the brigades of Cheatham's division to Tyner's by railroad on the 5th, and the remaining two on the 6th, and immediately thereafter to send the two brigades of my own division.

On the 8th instant I received orders from the commanding General to leave Brigadier General Cumming to bring on my division, and report in person at army headquarters as soon as possible after the arrival of Lieutenant General Longstreet at Sweetwater. He reached that point on the night of the 9th, and, as directed, I left Sweetwater on the morning of the 10th, arriving at Tyner's upon the same day.

I am, Colonel, respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. S. STEVENSON,
Major General commanding.

REPORT OF COLONEL MORRISON.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY FORCES,
Owens', near Sweetwater, Tennessee, }
Oct. 27th, 1863. }

Major J. J. REEVES, *A. A. G.:*

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that, agreeable to instructions from General Stevenson, I succeeded in getting my entire command, numbering about eighteen hundred men, across Hiwassee river, at and above Rencannon's ferry, by ten o'clock on the night of the 19th instant. I immediately took up the line of march for the rear of Philadelphia, the distance to the point where I expected to strike the Philadelphia and London road being fifty miles. The weather was very disagreeable, and the roads were in very bad condition, rendered worse every hour by the incessant showers that had been falling since I left Harrison. Men and officers bore up astonishingly under the circumstances, having, in crossing the river and making the march, lost two nights' sleep in succession. On arriving near Philadelphia, I communicated with Colonel Dibrell, suggesting that he had better move up and make a demonstration in the front, so that I could without interruption and undiscovered, make the enemy's rear; and reaching Pond creek, a point to the left of and opposite Philadelphia, I intercepted and captured a forage train and forty prisoners. From this point I sent a party on each of the roads leading into town, with instructions to drive in the enemy's pickets and hold their positions if possible, and thus prevent his learning the direction taken by the main part of my command. I finally reached the rear of Philadelphia, after a hard march of fifty miles in fifteen hours, unobserved. I caused the telegraph wire to be cut, and sent as rapidly as possible one regiment to London, a distance of four miles, there to make a feint and prevent General White from reinforcing Woolford at Philadelphia, with his infantry from that point. The surprise was complete, and the feint at London a success. I now hastened on to Philadelphia, a distance of two miles, and soon had a view of the enemy's line of battle, whereupon I dismounted my men and commenced the attack, Colonel Dibrell having opened an artillery duel in the front some time before. The enemy, on discovering me in their rear, at once turned their whole force, with six pieces of artillery, against my command, which was now reduced to about one thousand men. Afterwards ensued one of the hardest cavalry fights of the war, both sides struggling vigorously for the mastery. I was made to fall back twice, but with little effort each time rallied my men and soon had the enemy completely routed and flying in confusion towards London, capturing their artillery, (six pieces,) wagon train, ambulances, stores, and between five hundred and seven hundred prisoners. A portion of the latter was captured by Colonel Dibrell's command. The officers and men of my command conducted themselves hand-

somely from the commencement of the march to the rout of the enemy at Philadelphia, but credit is especially due to Colonel Hart, of the sixth Georgia; Colonel Rice, of the third Confederate, and Colonel Harper, of the first Georgia cavalry, who lost a leg while leading his men in a gallant charge. Colonels Rice and Hart occupied the left, and nobly did each do his duty. From an intrepid charge on the enemy's rear, his artillery, wagons, and stores, with most of the prisoners, fell into their hands. Lieutenant George Yoe, Captain Davidson Lainar, and Adjutant John W. Tench, acting on my staff, have my thanks for their assistance, efficiency, and gallantry on the field.

Although the victory was complete, the fruits of it fell short, far, of what they would have reached, if I had had the prompt co-operation of the forces in front.

The casualties in my command are fourteen killed, eighty-two wounded. Those of enemy much larger.

J. J. MORRISON,
Colonel commanding Second Cavalry Brigade.

Official :

JNO. J. REEVES, A. A. G. :

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REPORT OF COLONEL DIBRELL.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CAVALRY BRIGADE,
Armstrong's Division,
Sunday, 27th Oct., 1863.

Major J. J. REEVES, *A. A. G.:*

Sir: According to previous orders received, I moved with my brigade and a detachment of Gen. Morgan's command, from Charleston, on the 19th, at twelve o'clock, M.; crossed the Hiwassee river and travelled all night. By an agreement with Col. Morrison, commanding brigade, I was to be in front of Philadelphia by twelve, M., of the 20th. He was to cross the Hiwassee below me and move to the rear of the enemy. Subsequently Colonel M. notified me that he could not be at the appointed place before two o'clock, P. M. Meantime I advanced my forces, drove in the enemy's pickets, kept up a skirmish at a respectable distance, keeping all my command out of sight of the enemy, except two regiments and one section of artillery, until Colonel Morrison could get in position. As soon as this was known, I moved rapidly forward and opened upon the enemy with my artillery, and charged them with cavalry, held in readiness for that purpose, completely routing the enemy and scattering them through the woods in every direction, capturing in all six pieces of artillery, all their wagons, ambulances, stores, &c., and a large number of horses, equipments, &c., five hundred and six hundred prisoners.

In this engagement I only claim for my brigade that they did their part most admirably, and are entitled to the reputation they had previously so richly merited; and I fully accord to Colonel Morrison's brigade an equal share of all the glories won, for the gallant part acted by them in the engagements. Without their co-operation, so brilliant a success would have proven a failure, as the enemy were but a few miles from a large infantry force to support them.

My loss was one man killed and three captured. A few horses were wounded.

Brigadier General Vaughn had kindly volunteered his services, which were invaluable to me, and his gallantry and daring charge upon the enemy has endeared him to my brigade, and caused them all to regard him as one of the bravest of the brave.

In the engagement of the 23d my loss was five wounded. The loss of the enemy not known. In the engagement of yesterday, my loss was three wounded and five missing. Two horses were wounded. The enemy left some twelve or fifteen dead and wounded upon the field, and are known to have had three commissioned officers and several privates killed and a number wounded.

The conduct of the men and officers, both cavalry and artillery, was very fine during all the engagements.

I am, Major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. G. DIBRELL,
Colonel commanding Brigade.





